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Whose Best Interests? Custody and
Access Law and Procedure
NOEL SEMPLE *
This article compares the Law of custody and access disputes with the procedure used to resolve
them. The author argues that there is a fundamental contradiction between the two. The
former focuses on the interests of the children involved to the exclusion of everything else. The
Latter, however, is controlled by and designed to protect the rights and interests of the adult
parties to the dispute. Despite their doctrinal centratity in custody and access law, children
are usually silent and invisible in custody and access procedure. To resolve this contradiction,
the author proposes a focus on the costs and benefits of litigation between parents for the chil-
dren involved. As it stands, too much of the litigation that occurs between parents has more
costs than benefits for them. Some of these cases should be curtailed, and the proportionality
principle applied to others. Finally, children involved in custody and access litigation should
have a stronger voice when decisions are being made about their future.
Cet article compare ta l6gislation concernant les conftits en matibre de garde d'enfants et de
droit d'acces, et ta proc6dure utilis6e pour Les r6soudre. L'auteur fait valoir quit y existe une
contradiction fondamentaLe entre Les deux. La premiere met L'accent sur les int~rits des enfants
en cause h ['exclusion de tout le reste. Toutefois, La derniere est contr614e et concue en vue de
prot6ger Les droits et les int6rits des parties aduttes au titige. Malgre [a centralit6 doctrinaire du
droit en matibre de garde d'enfants et de droit d'acces, les enfants sont habituellement silen-
cieux et invisibles Lors de La proc6dure relative a ta garde d'enfants et au droit d'acces. Dans
le but de resoudre cette contradiction, lauteur propose de mettre laccent sur les frais et les
avantages du litige entre Les parents 6 l'gard des enfants en cause. A theure actuette, une trop
grande partie des litiges survenant entre Les parents pr6sentent pour eux plus de frais que
d'avantages. Certaines de ces causes devraient tre suspendues et te principe de ta propor-
tionnalite devrait 6tre apptiqu6 aux autres. Pour finir, tes enfants en cause dans tes litiges de
garde d'enfants et de droit d'acces devraient avoir une voix plus forte torsque des decisions
sont prises pour leur avenir.
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CUSTODY AND ACCESS DISPUTES arise when separated parents cannot agree on
how to divide the ongoing rights and responsibilities of parenting.' "Custody"
usually means the right to make decisions on behalf of a child and the right to
have care and control of a child.2 "Access" refers to the right to be with or com-
municate with a child and may also include the right to obtain information
about a child.' While most parents resolve custody and access disputes privately,
a substantial number also pass through our courts.' In 1998, proposals to amend
1. This article focuses on disputes between individuals after relationship breakdown, as opposed
to adoption or child protection proceedings.
2. James G. McLeod, Child Custody Law and Practice, looseleaf (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at
5 1(1). These two meanings are sometimes distinguished as "legal custody" and "physical
custody," but usually an individual who has right to one of these two types of custody at a
given point in time will also have the right to the other.
3. See e.g. Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 [Children s Law Reform Act]. The
Ontario Act establishes the access parent's right to information at s. 20(5). The rights of
custody and access are bundled with concomitant responsibilities for the child's welfare.
4. Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), Court Services Division Annual Report 2008/2009
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 2009) at 32. During the year ending in April
2009, there were 75,108 new family proceedings filed in Ontario's courts, excluding child
protection matters. Statistics do not appear to be available on the proportion of cases that
involved child-related issues, as opposed to those that were exclusively financial in nature.
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the Divorce Act triggered a heated debate about joint custody and the allocation
of parenting time.' An apparent stalemate was reached in 2004,' although occa-
sional skirmishes continue.! Other disputes now swirl around custody and access,
with the issue of parental alienation surfacing most recently in the media.'
This article proposes to take a step back from these controversies and make
a more general claim: there is a fundamental contradiction in the system the state
uses to resolve custody and access disputes. The law focuses on the interests of
the children involved to the exclusion of all else. However, the procedure by
which the disputes are resolved primarily empowers the adult parties to the dispute.
I will argue that this contradiction is worth resolving, and will suggest how this
might be done.
However, the author asked judges and lawyers about the issue during a series of interviews.
One family lawyer noted that 90 per cent of her cases involved a custody or access issue, and
a judge at the Ontario Court ofJustice said that in two years on the bench, she had only heard
two cases where there was no parenting issue. In the Superior Court ofJustice, child-related
issues appear to be somewhat less ubiquitous, with one judge indicating that "easily half if not
more" of the cases have them. Ethics approval was granted for the interviews by York University
Human Participants Review Sub-Committee (Certificate Number 2009-161, granted on 25
November 2009).
5. R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.), c. 3 [Divorce Act]; Special Joint Committee on Custody and Access,
For the Sake of the Children: Report of the Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access
by Landon Pearson & Roger Gallaway (Ottawa: Senate and House of Commons, 1998);
Marie Laing, "For the Sake of the Children: Preventing Reckless New Laws" (1999) 16 Can.
J. Fam. L. 229; Nicholas Bala, "Report from Canada's 'Gender War Zone': Reforming the
Child-Related Provisions of the Divorce Act" (1999) 16 Can. J. Fam. L. 163; Susan B. Boyd,
"Can Child Custody Law Move Beyond the Politics of Gender?" (2000) 49 U.N.B.L.J. 157;
and Linda C. Neilson, "Putting Revisions to the Divorce Act Through a Family Violence
Research Filter: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly" (2003) 20 Can. J. Fam. L. 11.
6. Janice Tibbetts, "Martin Government Shelves Plan to Overhaul Divorce, Child-Custody Law"
The Ottawa Citizen (6 February 2004) Al.
7. A number of private members' bills by Conservative MPs have sought to create an "equal
parenting" presumption in the Divorce Act (e.g. Maurice Vellacott's Bill C-422, An Act to
amend the Divorce Act (equal parenting) and to make consequential amendments to other Acts,
2d Sess., 40th Parl., 2009). However, the government has never introduced or endorsed any
of these, and the minister of justice recently announced his opposition to the proposed
change. See Cristin Schmits, "Federal AG Nixes Equal Parenting Presumption" Lawyers
Weekly (28 August 2009).
8. See e.g. Susan Pigg, "Family Subterfuge Leaves Lasting Scars" Toronto Star (31 March 2009)
El; Kirk Makin, "Parental Alienation Cases Draining Court Resources" The Globe and Mail
(13 May 2009) A8.
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Part I focuses on the legal doctrine, to demonstrate the near-universality of
the "best interests of the child" principle in statutes, case law, and normative schol-
arship. Part II turns to the procedure, asking who decides whether the procedure
occurs, controls the evidence, and decides when the procedure ends. Part III will
suggest two alternatives to resolve this inconsistency between doctrine and pro-
cedure. We might acknowledge the legitimacy of parents' interests in custody and
access disputes, as the American Law Institute (ALI) proposed to do in 2002.!
Alternatively, there may be ways to reform the custody and access dispute reso-
lution procedure to better serve the best interests of the children involved.
I. LAW-THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
The legal concept of "best interests of the child" (BIC) is the golden thread
running through the Canadian law of custody and access. As this Part will dem-
onstrate, statutes and case law have repeatedly and forcefully stated that the
interests or rights claims of the adults involved in the dispute are not relevant.
The golden thread of BIC is also woven into almost all of the normative scholar-
ship about private parenting disputes. This Part will trace the thread to show
the remarkable degree of consensus supporting BIC, before identifying the
distinctiveness of this legal standard.
A preliminary question arises: what is meant by the "best interests of the
child" in the context of a custody or access dispute? At the level of case-by-case
decision making, judges often have great difficulty applying this standard.'o
Determining what outcomes would be "best" for a given child, as Robert Mnookin
aptly put it, "poses a question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of
9. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations (St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers, 2002) at s. 2.08 -
"Allocation of Custodial Responsibility" [American Law Institute]. See Part III(A)(1),
below, for an account of this proposal.
10. Martin Guggenheim, What's Wrong with Children's Rights (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2005) at 153. See also the judgment of L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in Young v. Young, [1993]
4 S.C.R. 3 at para. 71 [Young]. Her judgment states,
A determination of the best interests of the child encompasses a myriad of considerations, as
child custody and access decisions have been described as "ones of human relations in their
most intense and complex form." ... Courts are required to predict the happening of future
events rather than to assess the legal import of past acts and judge the effect of various
relationships on the best interests of the child, all the while weighing innumerable variables
without the benefit of a simple formula.
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life itself."" Even a judge who is certain about what outcomes are best in general
may be no closer to being able to predict which decision is most likely to produce
those outcomes. Some scholars have claimed that BIC is essentially indeterminate
or unknowable by law.12
However, there are two points of consensus regarding what is in children's
best interests after their parents' relationship ends. First, all else being equal, chil-
dren typically benefit from the preservation of meaningful relationships with both
of their parents." Second, inter-parental conflict is not in the interests of children,
especially if the children are aware of that conflict." Much of the live controversy
in the literature is about how to reconcile these two principles. Specifically, scholars
debate whether reforms designed to strengthen children's relationships with both
parents post-separation would increase conflict to the extent that they would do
more harm than good."
11. Robert H. Mnookin, "Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy" (1975) 39 Law & Contemp. Probs. 226 at 260.
12. John Dewar, "The Normal Chaos of Family Law" (1998) 61 Mod. L. Rev. 467 at 479; Jon
Elster, "Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child" (1987) 54 U. Chicago
L. Rev. 1. See also Robert Leckey, "Families in the Eyes of the Law: Contemporary Challenges
and the Grip of the Past" (2009) 15:8 IRPP Choices 2 at 20. Leckey describes it as "an open-
textured concept[,] ... a vessel into which judges in individual cases must pour content."
13. See e.g. Jennifer E. McIntosh, "Legislating for Shared Parenting: Exploring Some
Underlying Assumptions" (2009) 47 Fam. Ct. Rev. 389 at 391; Seth J. Schwartz & Gordon
E. Finley, "Mothering, Fathering, and Divorce: The Influence of Divorce on Reports of and
Desires for Maternal and Paternal Involvement" (2009) 47 Fam. Ct. Rev. 506 at 506; and
Nicholas Bala & Nicole Bailey, "Enforcement of Access & Alienation of Children: Conflict
Reduction Strategies & Legal Responses" (2004) 23 Can. Fam. L.Q. 1. This idea is reflected
in Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 9(3)
[UNCRq. The Article sets forth the following: "States Parties shall respect the right of the
child who is separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct
contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best
interests." The UNCRC has been ratified but not enacted in Canada.
14. Andrew Schepard, "Parental Conflict Prevention Programs and the Unified Family Court: A
Public Health Perspective" (1998) 32 Fam. L.Q. 95 at 95, 105; David B. Doolittle & Robin
Deutsch, "Children and High-Conflict Divorce: Theory, Research, and Intervention" in
Robert M. Galatzer-Levy & Louis Kraus, eds., The Scientific Basis of Child Custody Decisions
(Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1999) 425 at 426, 430; and Joan Kelly & Robert E. Emery,
"Children's Adjustment Following Divorce: Risk and Resilience Perspectives" (2003) 52
Fam. Rel. 352 at 353.
15. See e.g. Martha Shaffer, "Joint Custody, Parental Conflict and Children's Adjustment to Divorce:
What the Social Science Literature Does and Does Not Tell Us" (2007) 26 Can. Fam. L.Q. 285 at
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Also incontrovertible is the absence of the word "parents" from the phrase
"best interests of the child." The law's instruction to resolve disputes according
to the best interests of the child therefore precludes consideration of parental
interests as ends in themselves. It may well be that solicitude for the emotional
and/or financial well-being of a child's parents is an effective means to the end
that is BIC." Children's interests are served by positive relationships with parents,
which in turn may require legal attention to the needs of those parents." However,
unless they are instrumental to the interests of the child, parents' claims regarding
what they need or are entitled to are irrelevant according to the BIC doctrine.
A. STATUTE
Custody and access law is governed by the federal Divorce Act when the applicant
is or seeks to be divorced, and by provincial legislation otherwise. These statutes
all instruct decision makers in custody and access cases to choose the available out-
come that is most consonant with the best interests of the child." The Divorce
Act states that "the court shall take into consideration only the best interests of
the child" in making or varying an order about the custody of or access to a child."
314; Richard A. Warshak, "Punching the Parenting Time Clock:- The Approximation Rule, Social
Science, and the Baseball Bat Kids" (2007) 45 Fam. Ct. Rev. 600; and Michael Saini & Rachel
Birnbaum, "Linking Judicial Decision Making in Joint Custody Awards with Evidence-based
Practice: It is Possible" (2005) 24 Can. Fam. L.Q 139. However, a few advocates for a joint
custody presumption actually claim that this reform would reduce interparental conflict. See e.g.
Edward Kruk, Child Custody Access and Parental Responsibility: The Searchfjr a just and Equitable
Standard (2008), online: <http://www.fira.calcms/documents/181/April7_Krukpdf>; Pearson &
Gallaway, supra note 5 at vi.
16. Juliet Behrens, "The Form and Substance of Australian Legislation on Parenting Orders: A
Case for the Principles of Care and Diversity and Presumptions Based on Them" (2002) 24
J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 401 at 414; Maria Coley, "Children's Voices in Access and
Custody Decisions: The Need to Reconceptualize Rights and Effect Transformative Change"
(2007) 12 Appeal 48; and Solangel Maldonado, "Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing
Hostility and Conflict after Divorce" (2008) 43 Wake Forest L. Rev. 441.
17. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, "Parents As Fiduciaries" (1995) 81 Va. L. Rev. 2401 at
2415; Behrens, ibid.
18. See e.g. Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5, ss. 32-45. Alberta's Act has replaced the terms
"custody" and "access" with "parenting order," "contact order," and "time with the child."
However, this difference in language does not appear to reflect or to have created a difference
in the law.
19. Supra note 5, ss. 16(8), 17(5).
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Two other subsections in the Divorce Act elaborate on the BIC principle, with-
out compromising it. Section 16(9) states that the past conduct of a person is to
be considered only if it is "relevant to the ability of that person to act as a parent
of a child."20 No evidence or consideration relevant to BIC would be excluded
by this provision.21 Section 16(10) of the Divorce Act may appear at first glance
to compromise the BIC principle. It provides that
the court shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have
as much contact with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the
child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of the per-
son for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact.22
The same language appears in Saskatchewan's Children ' Law Act.23 This is
Canada's version of the "friendly parent" rule, versions of which appear in cus-
tody and access statutory provisions in many Western jurisdictions. 24 It has gen-
erated some controversy and has been read as favouring the interests of fathers
over mothers.25 In the Divorce Act (although not in Saskatchewan's Children's
Law Act), the section bears the marginal note "Maximum Contact."26
However, the friendly parent rule does not, on its face, detract from or com-
promise the BIC principle. It merely states that the amount of contact that the
court orders the child to have with each parent should be the amount that reflects
the child's best interests. The legislative text itself takes no position regarding
what amount of contact this would be in any given case. The phrase "Maximum
Contact" is a "marginal note," and the Interpretation Act states that marginal
20. Ibid., s. 16(9).
21. See also Manitoba's Family Maintenance Act, C.C.S.M. c. F20, s. 39(3): "[i]n considering an
application under this section, a court shall only receive evidence of the conduct of either
parent if the court is satisfied that the evidence bears directly on the parent's ability to care
properly for the child."
22. Divorce Act, supra note 5, s. 16(10).
23. Children's Law Act, 1997, S.S. 1997, c. C-8.2, s. 6(5).
24. Brenda Cossman & Roxanne Mykitiuk, "Reforming Child Custody and Access Law in
Canada: A Discussion Paper" (1998) 15 Can. J. Fam. L. 13 at 51; Linda D. Elrod, "Counsel
for the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now" (1992) 26 Fam. L.Q. 53.
25. See e.g. Anne Marie Delorey, "Joint Legal Custody: A Reversion to Patriarchal Power"
(1989) 3 C.J.W.L. 33 at 40; Jonathan Cohen & Nikki Gershbain, "For the Sake of the
Fathers? Child Custody Reform and the Perils of Maximum Contact" (2001) 19 Can. Fam.
L.Q. 121.
26. Divorce Act, supra note 5, s. 16(10).
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notes "form no part of the enactment, but are inserted for convenience of reference
only."27 If one accordingly disregards the phrase, the text of section 16(10) might
just as easily be relied upon to favour a custodial parent who has taken steps to
ensure that a violent access parent is being kept away from the child. A court
might reason that the amount of contact that is consistent with the child's best
interest is none at all, and take into account the custodial spouse's willingness to
facilitate that level of contact. Even if the marginal note is given effect, the friendly
parent rule still only means that if two possible outcomes are exactly equal with
regard to BIC, the court should choose the one that involves more equal time.
It does not, therefore, reflect any form of deviation from the BIC principle.28
The same is true of provincial and territorial family law statutes, which apply
to custody and access when the parties are not divorced. Each of these twelve
statutes includes the phrase "welfare of the child," 29 "interest of the child,"" or
"best interests of the child"' in its provisions pertaining to custody and access. 2
27. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21, s. 14.
28. Recent decisions have exhibited some reluctance to order sole custody. See e.g. Breakey v.
Block (2009), 334 Sask. R. 183 at para. 27 (Q.B. (Fam. Div.)); Blank v. Micallef [2010]
W.D.F.L. 552 at para. 63 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). An increasing number avoid using the word
"custody" at all, preferring to establish a detailed calendar and division of responsibilities.
However, courts have reiterated that there is no presumption in Canadian law for the
maximization of contact. In Cavanaugh v. Balkaron (2008), 446 A.R. 302 (CA), the Alberta
Court of Appeal overturned a trial judgment (53 R.F.L. (6th) 295 (Q.B.)) that seemed to
adopt shared parenting as a starting point. The higher court held at para. 12 that "there are
no ... presumptions or default positions that regulate decisions as to custody and access. The
sole determinant is the best interests of the child." An Ontario court found likewise in Foster v.
Foster, [2009] W.D.F.L. 2824 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), additional reasons [20101 W.D.F.L. 12 (Ont.
Sup. Cr. J.) at para. 35. See also Young, supra note 10 at para. 204. The judgment of McLachlin J.
reconciles the friendly parent rule with the primacy of BIC in the following way:
[b]y mentioning this factor, Parliament has expressed its opinion that contact with each parent is
valuable, and that the judge should ensure that this contact is maximized.... [To the extent that
contact conflicts with the best interests of the child, it may be restricted. But only to that extent.
29. Maintenance and Custody Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 160, s. 18(5).
30. Arts. 604, 606 C.C.Q.
31. All the other provincial statutes use this phrase.
32. The Children's Law Act, S.N.W.T. 1997, c. 14 applies to both the Northwest Territories and
Nunavut. See also Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-33, s. 2(a).
Prince Edward Island is somewhat less explicit in endorsing the BIC principle. Section 2(a)
states four purposes of the Act, the first of which is "to ensure that applications to the court
in respect of custody of, incidents of custody of and access to, children will be determined on
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No Canadian statute confers rights on adults in custody and access disputes, or
indicates that their interests should be considered."
It is true that there is substantial heterogeneity in the factors that provincial
and territorial statutes identify as relevant to a child's best interests. However, the
variety in enumerated factors does not reflect disagreement about BIC itself. No
statute states that the enumerated factors are exhaustive, or provides any priority
among them. Indeed, it is not clear whether the factors have any impact whatsoever
on outcomes. Professor Jay McLeod observes that differences between the lists of
factors in the various applicable Canadian statutes have not resulted in substantive
differences in the jurisprudence." Jeffery Wilson concludes that the enumerated
factors "add nothing" to BIC as an "operative legal concept."3 5
B. CASE LAW
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has repeatedly emphasized the primacy of
the best interests principle in custody and access cases. With regard to access,
Young v. Young established that BIC is the only applicable test when a court consid-
ers proposed restrictions on the rights of an access parent.3 As noted in the judgment
of Justice McLachlin, "the express wording of s. 16(8) of the Divorce Act requires
the court to look only at the best interests of the child in making orders of custody
and access. This means that parental preferences and 'rights' play no role.""
the basis of the best interests of the children." The Act does not specifically state that the decision
maker is to resolve disputes on this basis. However, the other three purposes listed in s. 2(a)
are interjurisdictional in nature-they seek the correct balance between the jurisdiction of
P.E.I. and foreign courts. The P.E.I. statute does not contemplate parental interests or conduct
being relevant goals in custody and access decision making.
33. See Yukon's Children 'sAct, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 31, s. 1. The first section of the Act explicitly
subordinates them to BIC, stating that "if the rights or wishes of a parent or other person
and the child conflict the best interests of the child shall prevail."
34. McLeod, supra note 2 at § 1(1).
35. Jeffery Wilson & Maryellen Symons, Wilson on Children and the Law, looseleaf, vol. 1
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) at § 2.2.
36. See e.g. Gordon v. Goertz, [19961 2 S.C.R. 27 at para. 20 [Gordon]. The judgment refers to
"Parliament's view that the ultimate and only issue when it comes to custody and access is
the welfare of the child whose future is at stake." See also Van de Perre v. Edwards, [20011 2
S.C.R. 1014 [Van de Perre].
37. Young, supra note 10.
38. Ibid. at para. 202.
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Gordon v. Goertz concerned the variation of custody in cases in which the
custodial parent proposed to move with the child. A SCC majority found that
"the amendments to the Divorce Act in 1986 ... elevated the best interests of the
child from a 'paramount' consideration to the 'only' relevant issue."" A central
doctrinal issue in Gordon was whether there should be a presumption in favour
of the custodial parent's right to move with the child in such cases. The majority
reasons of Justice McLachlin for rejecting any such presumption emphasize the
absence of any place for parental rights. The "most important" reason identified
by the judgment for avoiding such a presumption is that it "tends to shift the focus
from the best interests of the child to the interests of the parents.""o The conclusion
emphasizes again that "the focus is on the best interests of the child, not the inter-
ests and rights of the parents.""
The most recent SCC judgment about custody or access was 2001's Van de
Perre v. Edwards. Whereas Young dealt with access and Gordon with variation of
custody, Van de Perre was an appeal of a first instance custody determination. In
this unanimous judgment, the court held that "the principal determination to be
made in cases involving custody is the best interests of the child." 2
Given the statutory authority of BIC, lower courts today have no leeway to
depart from the principle." However, even before BIC became the universal
statutory standard, it was treated as such by courts. The words "best interests of
the child" were added to Ontario statutes with the 1978 Family Law Reform Act,
and they appeared in the federal Divorce Act in 1985." However, by the late
1970s, courts were rarely acknowledging any basis other than BIC for a custody
or access order."
39. Gordon, supra note 36 at para. 19.
40. Ibid. at para. 46.
41. Ibid at para. 49.
42. Van de Perre, supra note 36 at para. 9.
43. Examples can be found of language that suggests an inchoate conception of parental rights or
interests. See e.g. Nash v. Nash, [2009] W.D.F.L. 3392 at para. 17 (Sask. Q.B. (Fam. Div.));
Lutz v. Lutz (2009), 329 Sask. R. 310 at para. 7 (Q.B.). However, these cases do not justify
the outcome on any basis other than BIC.
44. Family Law Reform Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c. 2, s. 35; Divorce Act, S.C. 1967-8, c. 24.
45. Nicholas Bala, "Developments in Family Law: The 1993-94 Term - The Best Interests of
the Child" (1995) 6 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 453; Ann Ehrcke, "Limiting Judicial Discretion in
Custody Proceedings on Divorce" (1987) 6 Can. J. Fam. L. 211 at 213-14.
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Before that time, the case law was characterized by gender and fault-based
presumptions that judges relied upon in custody and access disputes. The tender-
years doctrine, which was prevalent between 1930 and the early 1970s, held that a
child below a certain age was better off in the custody of his or her mother, all else
being equal." During roughly the same period, it was also sometimes presumed
that the "innocent party" in a divorce should be entitled to custody. 7 Decisions
were therefore made on the basis of findings of fact about adultery, cruelty, and
other marital "faults."
The important point is that these presumptions were not alternatives to the
BIC principle, but rather theories about what would be in the best interests of a
child in certain factual scenarios. For example, the 1948 judgment of the Court
of Appeal for Ontario in Youngs v. Youngs has been cited as an example of the inno-
cent party presumption." In refusing the adulterous father's application for custody,
the court stated that "it would be positively against [the children's] interest and
detrimental to their welfare to permit him to associate or visit with them."" Simi-
larly, the same court explained the tender years presumption in 1933 as follows:
"the mother, other things being equal, is entitled to the custody and care of a
child during what is called the period of nurture[,] ... the time during which it
needs the care of the mother more than that of the father."5 0
One must turn to nineteenth-century case law to find judges making custody
awards without justifying them on the basis of BIC. Before roughly 1900, there
existed a presumption that fathers were entitled to custody of their children. This
was based, at least in part, on a conception of the rights of the father." However,
46. Karina Winton, "'The Spoilt Darling of the Law': Women and Canadian Child Custody
Law in the Postwar Period (1945-1960)" (2002) 19 Can. J. Fam. L. 193; Susan B. Boyd,
Child Custody, Law, and Women's Work (Toronto: Oxford University Press Canada, 2002).
47. Edward D. Bayda, "Procedure in Child Custody Adjudication: A Study in the Importance of
Adjective Law" (1980) 3 Can. J. Fam. L. 57 at 65.
48. [1949] OW.N. 96 (C.A.) [Youngs], cited in Rachel Birnbaum, Barbara Jo Fidler &
Katherine Kavassalis, Child Custody Assessments: A Resource Guide for Legal and Mental Health
Professionals (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2008) at 6.
49. Youngs, ibid. at para. 4.
50. Re Orr, [1933] O.R. 212 at para. 12 (C.A.). According to McLeod, supra note 2 at § 5(1),
the tender years presumption "was justified on pragmatic grounds and the welfare of the
child was often the cited reason for the presumption."
51. Danaya C. Wright, "De Manneville v. De Manneville- Rethinking the Birth of Custody Law
under Patriarchy" (1999) 17 L.H.R. 247; Christopher Allan Jeffreys, "The Role of Mental
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since the demise of this paternal presumption, the law has consistently instructed
judges to make decisions on the basis of BIC. Only the presumptions about where
the child's interests would lie have shifted.
C. SCHOLARSHIP-MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR BIC
The legislative consensus supporting the BIC principle is mostly echoed in the
scholarship, despite a few significant dissents that will be reviewed in Part III(A),
below. For the majority, what Martha Fineman wrote in 1989 remains true today-
"[a]sserting that a... position conforms to, or is advanced in a manner designed
to advance, the best interests of the child has become the rhetorical price of entry
into the debate over custody policy."" BIC as a general principle is so firmly en-
sconced in the law that most scholars do not bother advocating or defending it.
Instead, custody and access literature hosts debates over whether certain parenting
arrangements should be presumed to be in the best interests of the child.
The general argument for a presumption is that it would enhance determi-
nacy and reduce litigation." Advocates for a statutory presumption about BIC will
make this argument and then claim that a certain parenting arrangement is usually
consonant with BIC, or that it is ordered less often than would be consonant with
BIC. For example, a number of scholars have endorsed a primary caretaker pre-
sumption, which would award sole custody to the parent who spent more time
caring for the child during the relationship, unless the best interests of the child
require otherwise." The primary caretaker presumption evolved from the tender
Health Professionals in Child Custody Resolution" (1986) 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 115 at 118.
52. Martha L. Fineman, "The Politics of Custody and Gender: Child Advocacy and the
Transformation of Custody Decision Making in the USA" in Carol Smart & Selma Sevenhuijsen,
eds., Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (New York: Routledge, 1989) 27 at 36.
53. Guggenheim, supra note 10 at 171; Katharine T. Bartlett, "Preference, Presumption,
Predisposition, and Common Sense: From Traditional Custody Doctrines to the American
Law Institute's Family Dissolution Project" (2002) 36 Fam. L.Q. 11 at 16.
54. Elster, supra note 12 at 37; David L. Chambers, "Rethinking the Substantive Rules for
Custody Disputes in Divorce" (1984) 83 Mich. L. Rev. 477 at 478; Fineman, supra note 52;
Nora Holtrust, Selma Sevenhuijsen & Annick Verbraken, "Rights for Fathers and the State:
Recent Developments in Custody Politics in the Netherlands" in Smart & Sevenhuijsen,
supra note 52, 51; and Laura B. Dupaix, "Best Interests Revisited: In Search of Guidelines"
(1987) Utah L. Rev. 651 at 661-66. For Canadian perspectives on the primary caretaker
presumption, see Bruce Ziff, "The Primary Caretaker Rule: Canadian Perspectives on an
American Development" (1990) 4 Int'l J.L. & Fam. 186; Susan Boyd, "Potentialities and
Perils of the Primary Caregiver Presumption" (1990) 7 Can. Fam. L.Q. 1.
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years doctrine. It is gender neutral, but given prevailing childcare patterns
within intact families it would produce the same result in most cases.
The "approximation standard," in turn, evolved from the primary caretaker
presumption. It holds that
the court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial
time the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each
parent spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents' sepa-
ration or, if the parents never lived together, before the filing of the action.5 5
It also looks to parenting arrangements prior to the breakdown in order to struc-
ture arrangements afterwards, but it does not have the "all or nothing" quality of
the primary caretaker presumption." Another group of scholars argues for a joint
custody or shared-parenting presumption.5 Today, those in this group are more
likely to advocate presumptions about the amount of time the child should spend
with the two parents, as opposed to the allocation of rights involved in custody."
Joint custody presumptions have been introduced in several American states, but
they have had less success in Canada.
What unites these scholarly arguments for presumptions is their claim to
be salutary for the children involved." For example, a number of joint custody
presumption advocates have cited this conclusion from Robert Bauserman's meta-
analysis: "[c]hildren in joint custody are better adjusted, across multiple types of
measures, than children in sole (primarily maternal) custody.""o However, those
who support a primary caretaker presumption or approximation standard, and
those who advocate a simple BIC standard without presumptions, have identified
other research results that seem to reflect children's interests just as clearly.
55. American Law Institute, supra note 9 at s. 2.08.
56. Guggenheim, supra note 10 at 150.
57. Kruk, supra note 15; Shannon Dean Sexton, "A Custody System Free of Gender Preferences
and Consistent with the Best Interests of the Child: Suggestions for a More Protective and
Equitable Custody System" (1999) 88 Ky. L.J. 761; and Brian J. Melton, "Solomon's Wisdom
or Solomon's Wisdom Lost: Child Custody in North Dakota-A Presumption that Joint Custody
is in the Best Interests of the Child in Custody Disputes" (1997) 73 N.D.L. Rev. 263.
58. Schwartz & Finley, supra note 13 at 519.
59. Bartlett, supra note 53 at 16.
60. Robert Bauserman, "Child Adjustment in Joint-Custody Versus Sole-Custody Arrangements: A
Meta-Analytic Review" (2002) 16 J. Fam. Psychol. 91 at 97. Bauserman was cited, for
example, by Kruk, supra note 15.
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Martha Shaffer, for example, reviewed a number of studies and concluded that
"the research to date indicates that children do not fare better post-divorce in
joint custody arrangements than they do in sole custody, and some children-
including those in high conflict families-may fare worse.""
Helen Reece observes that even those few authors who may appear to be
arguing against BIC are actually arguing only against the broad and unelaborated
form in which BIC appears in our law. She claims that the true position of this
group is not that adults' rights should be given effect, but rather that "a more de-
terminate principle would serve the child's interests better, since it would lead to
decisions which would be both arrived at more quickly and more acceptable to
the parents."" Reece's conclusion regarding the literature as a whole is simply that
"everybody agrees that children's welfare should be paramount.""
D. THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF BIC
The primacy of BIC makes custody and access a unique area of our law, insofar as
the litigants in a custody or access dispute have no legitimate rights or interests in the
outcome. Professor Reece points out that "there is no other area of the law in which
only one participant is valued."" Reece seems to be correct that the law is distinc-
tive in its focus on a single individual. However, as will be pointed out in Part
II, the individual in question is very often not a "participant" in the process at all.
There is thus a sharp distinction between custody and access on the one hand
and financial family law disputes on the other. A dispute over spousal support or
matrimonial property division is in a fundamental way akin to a contract or tort
dispute. It involves litigants asserting their own legal rights against each other. Child
support was created by our law, at least in part, for the benefit of children."
61. Shaffer, supra note 15 at 287. See also the judgment of L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in Young, supra
note 10 at para. 79, paraphrasing the argument made for the primary caretaker presumption
in Boyd, supra note 54. The judgment states, "[O]ne of the principal rationales for endorsing
this presumption is not to supplant the best interests of the child as the ultimate objective
but to ensure that those interests are protected."
62. Helen Reece, "The Paramountcy Principle, Consensus or Construct?" (1996) Curt. Legal
Probs. 267 at 274.
63. Ibid. at 271.
64. Ibid. at 275.
65. Federal Child Support Guidelines, S.O.R.197-175, s. I [Federal Child Support Guidelines].
Section I states, "[Tihe objectives of these Guidelines are a) to establish a fair standard of
support for children that ensures that they continue to benefit from the financial means of
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However, child support is almost always money that the law requires one parent
to pay to another." The law does not require the recipient parent to spend the
money received on the child, nor does it require the payor parent to pay child sup-
port to the child if the recipient does not seek it. Despite its name, child support law is
a balancing of the rights of the two adult litigants. It is therefore fundamentally
akin to spousal support and matrimonial property division, and fundamentally
different from custody and access law.
Nor does child protection law share the distinctive nature of custody and ac-
cess. The purpose of child protection law, like custody and access law, is to uphold
the best interests of children."7 The state intervenes in families in order to protect
children, which is consonant with the BIC principle. However, for constitutional
and policy reasons, parents are allowed to assert their own rights of family auton-
omy and privacy in the process." Child protection law is a contest between these
parental rights and the state's obligation to protect endangered children. Insofar
as parental rights are a key feature of child protection law, it is unlike custody and
access law.
Indeed, there does not seem to be any part of the law that shares the distinctive
feature of custody and access law-the irrelevance of the interests and rights
claims of the parties to the dispute. This distinctiveness leads logically to questions
about the procedure whereby custody and access claims are adjudicated. Does the
procedure, like the law, disregard the interests of the parties in favour of those of
the child? Part II, below, takes up this question.
II. PROCEDURE-THE RIGHTS OF THE PARENT
The word "procedure" is not used in this Part to refer to the voluntary efforts
that the parties may make to resolve their dispute, such as mediation, collabora-
tive family law, or traditional negotiation." These do not result in a binding
both spouses after separation."
66. In rare cases involving adult children, child support may be ordered payable to the child
directly.
67. See e.g. ChildandFamily Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.11, s. 1(1). The subsection states,
"The paramount purpose of this Act is to promote the best interests, protection and well
being of children."
68. See e.g. New Brunswick (Minister ofHealth and Community Services) v. G. (.), [19991 3
S.C.R. 46.
69. Such efforts may or may not be "court-connected," and participation may or may not be
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outcome unless the parties agree. Rather, the focus here is on the procedure by
which the state imposes a solution to the dispute if the parties do not agree and
initiate litigation.
Part 1I will ask (i) who decides if the procedure occurs, (ii) whose evidence
predominates during the procedure if and when it does occur, and (iii) who decides
when the procedure ends. I will suggest that there is a single answer to all three
of these questions: the adult parties. Thus, while custody and access law is focused
entirely on the best interests of children, in custody and access procedure it is the
rights of parents that predominate. While the law is distinctive in its exclusive
valorization of a non-party's interests, custody and access litigation procedure is
fundamentally akin to other civil litigation-the parties are in control." Some
elements of the procedure endow one parent with control at the expense of the
other and others endow them collectively, but very few are designed to place the
child's interests first.
This reality is tellingly revealed by Ontario's Family Law Rules (FLR), which
apply to custody and access as well as other family disputes." Rule 2 of the FLR
states that their "primary objective [is] to enable the court to deal with cases
justly."72 Dealing with a case justly is then defined to include "ensuring that the
procedure is fair to all parties."" Because children are never (or almost never)
parties to the custody and access disputes that concern them," the FLR do not
include children's interests as part of their definition of justice. While the drafters
mandatory before litigation can be conducted. Some ADR processes used to resolve family
disputes are consciously designed to protect the interests of children involved in custody and
access disputes. See e.g. Sharlene A. Wolchik et at, "The New Beginnings Program for
Divorcing and Separating Families: Moving from Efficacy to Effectiveness" (2009) 47 Fam.
Ct. Rev. 416; American Bar Association, "Model Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation" (2001) 35 Fam. L.Q. 27.
70. Gerald W. Hardcastle, "Adversarialism and the Family Court: A Family Court Judge's
Perspective" (2005) 9 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 57 at 65-66.
71. 0. Reg. 114/99 [Family Law Rules].
72. Ibid., s. 2(2).
73. Ibid., s. 2(3)(a).
74. It is not clear whether statutes even permit a minor child to have party status in a custody or
access dispute anywhere in Canada, according to Wilson & Symons, supra note 35, vol. 2 at
§ 6.4. See also Noel Semple, "The Silent Child: A Quantitative Analysis of Children's
Evidence in Canadian Custody and Access Cases" (2010) 29 Can. Fam. L.Q. I [Semple,
"The Silent Child"]. The author reviewed 181 reported custody and access decisions from
2009 and did not find children with party status in any of them.
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of Rule 2 probably did not consciously intend to put parents ahead of children, my
argument is that this provision's exclusion of children's interests is generally
representative of custody and access procedure."
A. PARENTS DECIDE IF THE PROCEDURE OCCURS
After separating, parents have two powerful procedural rights. First, each parent
has the right to initiate the custody and access decision-making procedure at least
once. Second, subject to a narrow set of exceptions, each parent has the right to
avoid the decision-making procedure."
The adult right to initiate the procedure is based in two statutes. Section 21
of the Children ' Law Reform Act (CLRA) states that "a parent of a child or any
other person may apply to a court for an order respecting custody of or access
to the child or determining any aspect of the incidents of custody of the child.""
This provides a broad entitlement to bring an application, which the CLRA limits
in only two ways. Section 22 allows an Ontario court to decline jurisdiction if
another province would be a more appropriate venue for the litigation." Section
27 automatically stays the application if a Divorce Act action is brought and the
court hearing the CLRA application does not grant leave to continue it."
The Divorce Act requires that a "breakdown of [the] marriage"o be established
before a divorce can be granted. Both a final custody order, as well as an access
order, are considered corollary relief to a divorce, and can only be obtained after
a breakdown of the marriage."' However, evidence that the spouses have lived
separate and apart for a period of one year is sufficient to establish a breakdown.
82
75. See Family Law Rules, supra note 71, s. 3(5). It is interesting to note that the Rules justify
procedural variations on the basis of the child's best interests with regard to child protection,
but not with regard to custody or access cases.
76. Parent X may avoid the procedure, provided that Parent Y is willing to assume custody. In
the rare event that neither X nor Y wants custody, the parents might have to be involved in
arranging other parenting for the child, or else risk prosecution for neglect.
77. Supra note 3, s. 21.
78. Ibid., s. 22.
79. Ibid., s. 27.
80. Supra note 5, s. 8(1).
81. An interim custody or access order can be obtained pending the determination of a divorce
action. See ibid., s. 16(2).
82. Ibid., s. 8(1)-(2).
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The cumulative effect of the CLRA's lack of any threshold and the Divorce Act's
low threshold is that parents can almost invariably initiate the state's custody and
access decision-making procedure with regard to their children at least once.
Conversely, in the absence of child protection concerns, the state's custody
and access decision-making procedure is undertaken only ifone or both separated.
parents trigger it. Separating parents who wish to avoid the procedure are allowed
to do so, as long as they pass the relatively low standard of parenting required by
the child protection system. This is most obviously true when married or un-
married parents separate without a divorce. There is no legal obligation for them
to involve a neutral decision maker in any way.83
A divorce can only be granted by a judge, even if the divorcing parties have
reached an agreement about parenting arrangements. Section 11 (1)(b) of the
Divorce Act provides that "in a divorce proceeding, it is the duty of the court ...
to satisfy itself that reasonable arrangements have been made for the support of
any children of the marriage, having regard to the applicable guidelines." The
word "support" could conceivably be read to refer to parenting arrangements.
However, the reference to the Child Support Guidelines makes it clear that judges
need only scrutinize the financial arrangements," and the reality is that most
judges in Ontario today do not override consensual parenting arrangements.s
The most obvious reason why the parties might choose to avoid the procedure
is that they are in agreement about what is best for their child(ren). However, it
is misleading to assume that parents who have avoided the procedure have "settled,"
in the sense of negotiating an agreement that they both understand and accept.
Litigation has very substantial costs for parents in time, money, and stress, and
parents may simply abandon the effort to obtain a court order or oppose one
sought by another party.
83. See Children's Law Reform Act, supra note 3. In Ontario, to obtain an order for custody or
access under the Act, one must convince a judge of its merits. However, the law does not
require one to obtain such an order before acting as a parent to a child.
84. The jurisprudence confirms this reading of s. 11 (1)(b). The author was able to find only one
reported case in which s. 11 (1)(b) was used to decline the parties' request for a divorce order
incorporating their consensual custody arrangement. See Hayes v. Hayes (1987), 6 RF.L. (3d) 138
(Sask. Q.B.) (a trial level decision issued early in the life of the 1985 Divorce Act). Given that
judges have no power to secure compliance in the absence of litigation being commenced by one
of the parties, they are unlikely to use the power to withhold divorce in order to compel the
parties to formally adopt custody arrangements other than those that they prefer.
85. Supra note 5.
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B. PARENTS CONTROL MOST OF THE EVIDENCE
While the legal focus of custody and access litigation is the best interests of the
child(ren) involved, the evidence is entirely controlled by the adult litigants in a
very substantial portion of the litigated cases. There are two types of evidence in
custody and access litigation. Children ' evidence includes evidence coming either
directly from the child, from a lawyer representing the child, or from another
professional with child-related expertise. Parents' evidence includes everything else,
such as the statements of the parents and the friends and relatives whom they
choose to call."'
Although civil procedure generally allows only the parties to bring forward
evidence, children's evidence is welcomed by the law in custody and access cases.
For example, Ontario's CLRA states that "in considering an application under
this Part, a court where possible shall take into consideration the views and pref-
erences of the child to the extent that the child is able to express them."" The
SCC has called for attention to the views of the child, at least in the context of
variation applications.88
However, children do not in any part of the country have an enforceable
right to be involved in custody and access litigation that concerns them. To deter-
mine how often they actually do participate, the author undertook a quantitative
survey of all 181 custody and access decisions that were reported in either the
Westlaw Canada or the Quicklaw Canada databases during a five-month period
in 2009." The purpose of this study was to determine how many judgments in-
cluded any reference to children's evidence, as defined above.
86. Note, however, that Ontario's legislation was recently amended to require adults to submit
certain evidence when applying to court for a custody or access order. See Children's Law
Reform Act, supra note 3, s. 21. The required evidence includes a "plan for the child's care
and upbringing" and information about the applicant's past involvement in family, child
protection, or criminal proceedings.
87. Ibid., s. 64(1). See also British Columbia's Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128,
s. 24(1)(b); Art. 30 C.C.Q.
88. Gordon, supra note 36 at paras. 49(7)(d), 65.
89. See Westlaw Canada, online: <http://home.westlawecarswell.com>; Quicklaw Canada,
online: <http://www.lexisnexis.calen/quicklaw/>. Both of these databases use the phrase
"custody and access" in the keywords if a case is about a private parenting dispute. The
author reviewed all 302 cases with these keywords from the sample period, and excluded
those from the sample in which the outcome was not based on a judicial decision about the
best interests of the child.
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The results of this study are published elsewhere,90 and only the central
findings need be reproduced here. In 55 per cent of the judgments, no children's
evidence was mentioned. In these cases, the case report refers only to evidence
that came from the adult litigants themselves and from the witnesses that they
chose to call. Among the 45 per cent in which there was some sort of children's
evidence mentioned, it was usually a custody assessment.1 Children were repre-
sented by their own lawyers in only 7 per cent of the cases, and children's voices
were heard directly in only 3 per cent." In none of the 181 cases was a child an
actual party to the litigation. This research suggests that, in the majority of custody
and access cases, the adult litigants control all of the evidence.
In an earlier quantitative analysis of Quebec cases (both settled and adjudi-
cated), Rende Joyal and Anne Queniart found even less children's evidence.
Assessments were found in 12 per cent of their cases, testimony by children in 6
per cent, and child legal representation in 3 per cent.93 One author goes so far
as to conclude that children "are, for the most part, rendered invisible and voice-
less in legal proceedings."' It can at least be said that parents very often control
most or all of the evidence that comes before the decision maker in a custody
and access case.
C. PARENTS DECIDE WHEN THE PROCEDURE ENDS
If the procedure does begin, parents can also usually decide when it ends. While
they may-and hopefully do-consider their children's welfare in making these
decisions, their discretion is not substantially constrained by the children's pref-
90. Semple, "The Silent Child," supra note 74.
91. The recommendations made in these assessments are not necessarily determinative if the
adults' evidence points in a different direction. An earlier empirical study focused on
reported custody and access decisions in which recommendations were made by neutral
social worker assessors employed by Ontario's Office of the Children's Lawyer. Judges
accepted only approximately half of the 151 assessor recommendations about what outcome
would be in the best interest of the child. See Noel Semple, The Eye ofthe Beholder:
Professional Opinions about the Best Interests ofa Child (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law
School, 2009) [unpublished], online: <http://www.noelsemple.calp=47>.
92. Semple, "The Silent Child," supra note 74 at 13.
93. Renbe Joyal & Anne Queniart, "Enhancing the Child's Point of View in Custody and Access
Cases in Quebec: Preliminary Results of a Study Conducted in Quebec" (2002) 19 Can. J.
Fam. L. 173.
94. Coley, supra note 16 at 52.
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erences or interests. A custody or access dispute can be settled by the parties mutually
at any time, and either party can end the litigation by abandoning his or her
claim.95 Ontario's FLR provide at Rule 12(1) that "a party who does not want
to continue with all or part of a case may withdraw all or part of the application,
answer, or reply by serving a notice of withdrawal on every other party and filing
it."" However, a parent may bring the process to a halt by simply failing to appear
or pursue the litigation. Failure to file a notice of withdrawal will, at worst, produce
an order for costs if the other party seeks one.
Conversely, a parent has wide latitude to continue the procedure if he or she
chooses to do so, even in the face of a "final" ruling. Most parents resolve their
disputes without any, or with very limited, recourse to the courts. However, a
small but persistent minority relitigate continually about the custody and access
arrangements for their children. The parenting arrangement that is in the best
interests of a child depends on facts that can easily change, because children and
their needs evolve over time. Their parents' respective abilities to meet those needs
can also easily shift. Statute and case law have therefore established a relatively
low threshold for a party subject to an existing custody or access order who wishes
to continue litigating." This section will review the three primary procedural
impediments to relitigation of custody and access disputes. I will argue that,
despite these provisions, the only guaranteed end to custody and access litiga-
tion comes when the child in question becomes an adult in the eyes of the law.
In the words of Ontario Family Court Judge Harvey Brownstone, "[flamily
court orders involving children are never truly final.""
95. See Family Law Rules, supra note 71, ss. 2(5)(c), 17(4)-(6), 18(14)-(16). Settlement is actively
encouraged by the FLR. Rule 2(5)(c) requires the court to engage in "active management of
cases, which includes ... helping the parties to settle all or part of the case." Examples of this
policy in the FLR include Rules 17(4)-(6), which provide for case conferences, settlement
conferences, and trial management conferences respectively. For each of these, the first purpose
listed is "exploring the chances of settling the case." See also Rule 18(14)-(16), which make
settlement offers relevant to costs orders.
96. Ibid., s. 12(1).
97. Esther L. Lenkinski, Barbara Orser & Alana Schwartz, "Legal Bullying: Abusive Litigation
within Family Law Proceedings" (2003) 22 Can. Fam. L.Q. 337; Sandra A. Goundry, Final
Report on Court-Related Harassment and Family Law 'Justice' A Review of the Literature and
Analysis ofthe Case Law (Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law, 1998) at 38.
98. Harvey Brownstone, Tug of War: A Judge's Verdict on Separation, Custody Battles, and the
Bitter Realities ofFamily Court (Toronto: ECW Press, 2009) at 19.
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1. THE MATERIAL CHANGE THRESHOLD
Once a custody or access order has been made by a court, a party seeking to vary
it must demonstrate a "material change in [the] circumstances" of the child. The
CLRA uses these words at section 29(1)." The Divorce Act refers at section 17(5)
to a "change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of the child
of the marriage occurring since the making of the [previous] custody order," but
the SCC confirmed in Gordon that the change must have been "material.""o' The
SCC went on to explain the threshold as follows:
[t]he requirement of a material change in the situation of the child means that an
application to vary custody cannot serve as an indirect route of appeal from the
original custody order. ... Change alone is not enough; the change must have altered
the child's needs or the ability of the parents to meet those needs in a fundamental
way. ... [T]he question is whether the previous order might have been different had
the circumstances now existing prevailed earlier. ... [M]oreover, the change should
represent a distinct departure from what the court could reasonably have antici-
pated in making the previous order. 0 1
The material change threshold was created to prevent unnecessary litigation,
and courts do apply it to give effect to this intent. The Court of Appeal for Sas-
katchewan, for example, recently confirmed that the mere passage of time (and
increasing maturity of the child) cannot in and of itself constitute a material change
in circumstances.'02 Given the substantial number of variation applications that
are rejected on the material change threshold, it is probably an effective deterrent
to litigation of this nature.
However, the material change threshold does not by any means deprive par-
ents of their right to decide when the litigation will end. It can only be applied
by a judge. Thus, while it deters variation applications, if the application is com-
menced, litigation and its attendant costs will be required merely in order to
determine that there has been no material change.
More importantly, the material change threshold only applies to variation
applications, and parents who wish to continue litigating about their children
have various other avenues open to them. Like all court orders, custody and access
99. Children's Law Refrm Act, supra note 3, s. 29(1).
100. Divorce Act, supra note 5, s. 17(5); Gordon, supra note 36.
101. Gordon, ibid. at paras. 11-12.
102. Wiegers v. Gray, [2008] 291 D.L.R. (4th) 176 (Sask. C.A.), rev'g (2007), 291 Sask. R. 48
(Q.B.).
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judgments are subject to appeal.'os Contrary to some earlier suggestions of an
especially deferential standard of appellate review for custody and access cases
due to the child's interests in finality,'0 4 the SCC held in Van de Perre that "the
scope of appellate review does not change because of the type of case on appeal."'0 5
Rollie Thompson found that, among appellate custody decisions involving a pa-
rental mobility element issued between 1996-2006, the trial outcome was over-
turned in 45 per cent."' This suggests that appellate deference in parenting
decisions may be more of a "talk" than a "walk."
In addition to appealing a previous order, a party wishing to continue liti-
gation may allege that the other is in contempt of it. Given the complexity of
many court-ordered parenting schedules, breaches are common and any such
breach can be seized upon by a committed litigant looking to bring a contempt
motion.07 Motions may also be brought with regard to the admissibility of evi-
dence, costs, and various other procedural issues.
The saga of Geremia v. Harb offers an extreme example of how long par-
enting litigation can continue in the absence of any finding of a material change.
Frank Geremia and Lily Marie-Thirdse Harb were married in 1999, and their
daughter was born in the following year. They separated in 2001 and were
divorced in 2002. From 2001 until 1 May 2008, they litigated about the par-
enting arrangements for their daughter. At least twenty-five court orders were
produced by this dispute, including five lengthy judgments by Justice J.W.
Quinn of the Superior Court of Justice in St. Catherines."0 a At least eight differ-
103. Family Law Rules, supra note 71, s. 38.
104. See e.g. deVerteuil v. deVerteuil(1986), 5 R.F.L. (3d) 294 (B.C. C.A.).
105. Van de Perre, supra note 36 at para. 14.
106. D.A. Rollie Thompson, "Ten Years After Gordon: No Law, Nowhere" (2007) 35 R.F.L.
(6th) 307.
107. Family Law Rules, supra note 71, s. 31.
108. Quinn J.'s five sets of written and reported reasons in the matter of Geremia v. Harb were
delivered on 25 August 2006 (32 R.F.L. (6th) 218 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. (Gen. Div. Fain. Ct.)));
14 November 2006 ([20071 W.D.F.L. 2677 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. (Gen. Div. Fam. Ct.))); 24
January 2007 ([20071 W.D.F.L. 4500 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. (Gen. Div. Fam. Ct.))) [Geremia
(2007)]; 2 August 2007 (40 R.F.L. (6th) 362 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. (Gen. Div. Fam. Ct.))); and
1 May 2008 (90 O.R. (3d) 185 (Sup. Ct. J. (Gen. Div. Fam. Ct.))) [Geremia (2008)]. In
these reasons, reference was made to eight other unreported judgments on 2 May 2002, 15
September 2002, 31 July 2003, 15 November 2004, May 2007, September 2007, November
2007, and December 2007. In the May 2008 judgment, Quinn J. states that there were
310 (2010148 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
ent judges were involved, and the continuing record eventually occupied thirteen
volumes and two thousand pages."a' The trial that occurred in the summer and
fall of 2006 involved fifty-seven days of oral evidence."o The Office of the Chil-
dren's Lawyer (OCL) prepared three assessments about this parenting dispute.
Although custody is generally perceived to be a more significant issue than
access, custody was not an issue in this extreme example of repetitive litigation.
Geremia had consented to Harb having sole custody in 2002, with Geremia
exercising access. Motions to vary the terms of access were repeatedly brought
by both parties. Another central dispute was about Harb's obligation, pursuant to
one of the early court orders, to share medical and educational information about
the child with Geremia. Her failure to do so gave rise to three contempt mo-
tions, which in turn led to litigation about costs and a motion for leave to appeal.
The most recent-and perhaps final-judgment came on 1 May 2008.
Geremia had moved for increased access; Harb moved to dismiss Geremia's case
due to his failure to pay child support. Both parties sought costs with regard to
the foregoing litigation. Access was increased somewhat, and the cost claims of
both parties were dismissed due to their conduct. The most distinctive passage
in this judgment of Justice Quinn came in the final three paragraphs:
[f]inally, neither party shall be permitted to commence or continue any proceed-
ing in the Superior Court of Justice, directly or indirectly related to their child, with-
out first having obtained leave of the court. I make this order pursuant to subsec-
tion 140(1) of the Courts offustice Act. ... [T]he parties have gorged on court re-
sources as if the legal system were their private banquet table. It must not happen
again. ... By requiring leave, I do not think that I am impermissibly fettering access
to the courts by either party. If they have a case with merit, I expect that leave will
be granted and justice will be done.
11'
2. THE VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS THRESHOLD
The mechanism by which Justice Quinn brought Geremia v. Harb to an apparent
end was section 140(1)(a) of Ontario's Courts ofJustice Act, "Vexatious Proceed-
ings."112 This provision states that a litigant who has "persistently and without
twenty-five orders in all.
109. Geremia (2008), ibid.
110. Geremia (2007), supra note 108 at paras. 13-14, 17.
111. Geremia (2008), supra note 108 at paras. 94-96.
112. R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 140(a). There are analogous provisions in other provinces.
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reasonable grounds ... instituted vexatious proceedings in any court"" may be
forbidden to institute further proceedings without the leave of the court. The Court
of Appeal for Ontario has held that the purpose of this provision is to "codify the
inherent jurisdiction of the Superior Court to control its own process and to pre-
vent abuses of that process by authorizing the judicial restriction, in defined circum-
stances, of a litigant's right to access the courts.""' That court has also confirmed
that section 140(1)(a) can be used to prevent custody or access variation proceed-
ings undertaken without leave, even before applying the "material change" test."'
However, it is very rare for even the most protracted custody and access
litigation to be found vexatious."' M. (.M.) v. M (KA.A.)"' was a 2009 New-
foundland decision interpreting that province's version of the vexatious proceedings
rule. Like in Geremia, access was the primary issue. The court summarized the
procedural history of the case:
[t]he duration and extent of this litigation between the parents demonstrates their al-
most complete inability to resolve, without Court intervention, issues touching on
[the child]'s care and upbringing. There have already been 20 Court applications
in this matter addressing a myriad of issues. Examples include: child access, cus-
tody,. asset disclosure, discovery, document production, stay, contempt, judicial
bias, alienation, counselling, expert assessments, child support, directions, inter-
rogatories and more. The hearing on custody and access alone occupied 31 days in
Court. The costs to date exceed $600,000."'
113. Ibid
114. Kalaba v. Bylykbashi (2006), 265 D.L.R. (4th) 320 at para. 30 (Ont. C.A.).
115. Ballentine v. Ballentine (2003), 65 O.R. (3d) 481 at para. 39 (C.A.) [citations omitted]. The
judgment states,
It allows the court to make an order prohibiting a person who has persistently and
unreasonably instituted vexatious proceedings from instituting further legal proceedings
without leave of the court. This is particularly important in family law matters, given the
availability of variation orders for support and custody. ... Without some mechanism to
prevent abuse, a party could bring an endless stream of variation applications, with a new
one launched as soon as the last one has been denied. ... Accordingly, initiating new court
proceedings could become a form of harassment of one's former spouse. Section 140 of the
CJA is a mechanism to prevent such abuse.
116. See Philip Epstein & Lene Madsen, "Case Comment: Geremia v. Harb" (2008) Epstein and
Madsen's This Week in Family Law, Iss. 27. Commenting on Geremia v. Harb, experienced
lawyers Phil Epstein and Lene Madsen said, "We have not seen this kind of order before."
117. M. (.M) v. M. (KA.A.) (2009), 282 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 356 (N.L.S.C. Unif. Fam. Ct.),
considering Rulers ofthe Supreme Court, 1986, S.N.L. 1986, c. 42, Sch. D [M. (J.M)].
118. M (.M), ibid. at para. 7.
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The child was almost seventeen years old at the time of this decision. The
father's outstanding applications were for a professional assessment and for ac-
cess to information about the child. He was also seeking enforcement of a pre-
vious access order, although he had acknowledged that the adolescent child should
not be forcibly compelled to visit him. The mother moved for the case to be stayed
or dismissed. This position was supported by the intervenor, a guardian ad litem
lawyer representing the child.
The court found that although the litigation was "a very poor example for
the Court model of dispute resolution," nonetheless "it is not frivolous or vexa-
tious for a parent to seek access to his child and to seek information about his
child's health, education and welfare."" The judge added that "it would only
be in the most exceptional case that a Court would restrict in any way the free
access of any person to the Courts to assert his or her civil rights and remedies."120
The reference to rights in this dictum is a telling indication of the procedural
power that courts allow parents. While finding that the child's "best interests
would be well served if his parents were to agree to a cooling off period, say six
months," this was not ordered."' The motion for stay or dismissal was denied.
As the reasoning and result in M. (.M) suggest, the vexatious proceedings
threshold is not designed to curtail custody or access litigation at the point when
its continuance is more likely to harm than to help the child. It was drafted and
continues to be applied to protect the court-not the child. If and when these
provisions are used in this context, a great deal of water has already passed under
the bridge. For example, in Roscoe v. Roscoe, section 140(1)(a) of the Courts of
Justice Act was successfully invoked against a litigant who by his own account
had appeared in family court on seventy occasions with regard to his divorce."
Cases such as Geremia, M. (M.), and Roscoe are certainly extreme examples."
119. Ibid. at para. 18.
120. Ibid. at para. 19.
121. Ibid. at para. 20.
122. (2005), 24 R.F.L. (6th) 331 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), leave to appeal to C.A. granted, [2007]
W.D.F.L. 4604 (Ont. C.A.) [Roscoe]. The Court of Appeal upheld the s. 140 order, but
removed the requirement that Roscoe post $5,000 in security for costs if he were ever to seek
leave to continue. See also Warren v. Pollitt (1999), 33 C.P.C. (4th) 154 (Ont. Gen. Div.),
additional reasons [19991 O.J. No. 740 (Gen. Div.); A. (A.) v. A. (S.N), [2009] W.D.F.L.
1190 (B.C. S.C.), additional reasons [2009] 9 W.W.R. 337 (B.C. S.C.).
123. Others could certainly be found. A recent newspaper article described-without providing
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As noted above, the majority of parents resolve their disputes with little or no judi-
cial intervention. However, these cases demonstrate that the right of a parent to
choose when litigation over a minor child ends is little constrained by the law.
3. THE AGE OF CHILD THRESHOLD
While some courts are reluctant to make custody or access orders about older teen-
agers,12' the only guaranteed end to custody and access litigation comes when the
child who is the subject of the litigation ceases to be governed by the applicable
statute. Under Ontario's CLRA, custody and access orders may be sought with
regard to any child who is a minor.125 Under the Divorce Act, custody and access
orders may be made for "any or all children of the marriage."126 Minors who have
withdrawn from parental charge are not "children of the marriage."127 However,
a child who has attained the age of majority remains a "child of the marriage," and
therefore subject to parenting litigation, if he or she is "unable, by reason of illness,
disability or other cause, to withdraw from [the parents'] charge or to obtain the
necessaries of life."128 Until the child ceases to be subject to the CLRA or the Di-
vorce Act, no judicial decision about custody or access is necessarily final. Justice
Brownstone stated that an outcome that he has seen "far too many times" is one
in which "the parents keep litigating for so long that the child in question grows
up and becomes an adult."129
III. RESOLVING THE INCONSISTENCY
Part I of this article showed that the "best interests of the child" is a golden thread
running through the law governing custody and access disputes. Statute and case
the name of-an Ontario access dispute that produced 54 court hearings, and cost $200,000
in legal fees. See Susan Pigg, "I divorce, 54 hearings, 5 judges, $200,000" Toronto Star (8
May 2009) LI.
124. Ladisa v. Ladisa (2005), 193 O.A.C. 336; Clayton v. Clayton (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 24 (Ct. J.
(Gen. Div.)); and House v. Tunney (House) (1991), 95 Sask. R. 73 (QB.). See also Christine
D. Davies, "Access to Justice for Children: The Voice of the Child in Custody and Access
Disputes" (2004) 22 Can. Fam. L.Q. 153 at 157.
125. Children's Law Reform Act, supra note 3, s. 18(2).
126. Divorce Act, supra note 5, s. 16(1).
127. Ibid., s. 2(1)(a) at "child of the marriage."
128. Ibid., s. 2(1)(b).
129. Brownstone, supra note 98 at 14.
314 [2010) 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
law unequivocally instruct judges to choose the available outcome that is best
for the child or children involved. The majority of the normative scholarship
accepts this premise, and debates what, if any, legal reforms would be in the
interests of children. Part I concluded by identifying the feature that makes
custody and access law unique, namely that the parties to the dispute have no
legally recognized rights or interests in the outcome.'o
Part II examined the procedure by which the state resolves custody and access
disputes when the parties do not settle. Here, the parents are in charge. Parents
decide if the decision-making process occurs. If it does occur, they usually control
all or most of the evidence that comes before the decision maker. Finally, despite
the law's attempt to restrain relitigation through the material change and vexa-
tious proceedings provisions, adults retain a great deal of latitude to continue
litigating about custody and access until their children are no longer minors.
This inconsistency is a problem worth resolving. If we intend for adults to
have the rights and interests in parenting outcomes that their control of the pro-
cedure implies, then we should make these rights and interests explicit in our law.
If, on the other hand, we really do mean to put children first, then we must de-
sign a procedure that reflects this intention. This Part begins by considering the
case for law reform to valorize parents' interests. This is an agenda for which some
scholarly support can be found, and is one that the ALI has openly endorsed. It
then turns to procedural reform for children. After considering the costs and
benefits to children of parenting litigation, the article will sketch three avenues for
reform that may help ensure that the benefits exceed the costs.
A. LAW REFORM FOR PARENTS
1. SCHOLARSHIP: MINORITY SUPPORT FOR PARENTS' RIGHTS OR
INTERESTS
One way to resolve the inconsistency is to change the law to recognize parents'
interests or rights in parenting outcomes. This position is not entirely without
precedent in the literature, despite the preponderance of support that the BIC
principle has attracted in scholarly debate."' The protection of parental interests
or rights has sometimes been defended as instrumental in securing children's in-
130. As observed above, children are never or almost never parties to custody and access disputes
about them. See Semple, "The Silent Child," supra note 74.
131. See Part I(C), above.
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terests.'32 However, the authors reviewed below go further, arguing that parents
are worthy of the law's consideration in their own right.133
In the 1980s, David Chambers and Jon Elster both accepted the primacy of
children's interests, but argued against the total exclusion of parents from the law's
purview.'3 1 As Elster put the case, children deserve special protection, but "that pro-
tection should not ... extend to small gains in the child's welfare achieved at the
expense of large losses in parental welfare."'M Elster and Chambers differed about
what type of consideration parents should receive. The former argued that the law
should focus on parental rights rather than needs, because needs can be misrepre-
sented whereas rights are based on facts.'3 1 Chambers, in contrast, would have focused
more on parents' emotional need for relationships with their children. He argued
for a primary caregiver presumption for children under six years of age in part be-
cause the secondary caregiver would probably experience less emotional devastation
from being deprived of custody than the primary caregiver would in these cases.137
An attack on BIC from a different angle came in the 1996 article by English
law professor Helen Reece, mentioned in Part I, above.'" The statutory and
132. See e.g. Andrew S. Watson, "The Children of Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following
Divorce" (1969) 21 Syracuse L. Rev. 55 at 78; Scott & Scott, supra note 17 at 2439-40; and
Carol Smart & Bren Neale, Family Fragments? (Malden, Mass.: Polity Press, 1999) at 198-99.
133. According to one recent paper from researchers at Arizona State University, this position has
some support in public opinion. Respondents were read vignettes, and were then asked how
parenting time should be allocated. Their responses led the authors to conclude that the
respondents are as concerned with making decisions that are fair to the parents as they are
with ensuring that custody decisions reflect what is best for the children. See Sanford L Braver et
aL, "Lay Judgments about Child Custody After Divorce: Child's Best Interests or Fairness to
Parents?" (2009) [unpublished], online: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=1435043>.
134. Chambers, supra note 54; Elster, supra note 12. See also Scott Altman, "Should Child
Custody Rules be Fair?" (1996) 35 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 325 at 352-53. In a similar vein,
Altman concludes that "child custody rules can consider fairness to adults and still give child
welfare due consideration. ... [S]ometimes children either have little to lose, or we have
insufficient information as a practical matter to know which of two decisions will best serve
the child's interests."
135. Elster, ibid at 20.
136. Ibid. at 19. Elster states, "It seems best ... to use rights as a proxy for needs, even if on first-
best principles one would want to discount rights not backed by needs."
137. Chambers, supra note 54.
138. Reece, supra note 62.
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scholarly paramountcy of the BIC principle in English law is perhaps even more
pronounced than in Canadian or American law. Reece argued that children's
interests should not have this privileged status. The central defect that Reece
finds in BIC is that its indeterminacy allows it to function as a smokescreen, an
empty bit of rhetoric facilitating courts' imposition of orthodox sexual morality.'
Reece convincingly makes this case with regard to custody and access cases in-
volving one homosexual and one heterosexual parent. However, she does not
develop this critique with regard to the overwhelming majority of parenting
disputes, which are not of this nature."'
A final example of dissent from the BIC consensus comes from an article
published by Nicholas Bala and Nicole Bailey in 2004. They observe that "for
the high-conflict cases where the parties are most likely to seek the involvement
of the justice system, there is social science evidence that [access] can have a nega-
tive influence on children's emotional well-being.""' This is because access in
these cases causes parental conflict that is harmful to the child, and this harm
outweighs any benefit to the child brought about by the contact itself. However,
despite this fact, Bala and Bailey proceed to list a number of "powerful argu-
ments for recognizing and enforcing access rights in most high-conflict cases,"
even when that access would not be in the interests of the child involved.142
Some of these are arguments that the best interests of children generally require
enforcement of access in a particular case, even if it is contrary to the interests of the
specific child involved. For example, they suggest that access enforcement litigation
has a general deterrent effect, reducing the likelihood that other custodial parents
will deny access and also deterring litigation about parenting generally."' However,
139. Ibid.
140. See Semple, "The Silent Child," supra note 74. In the author's survey of all 181 Canadian
custody and access judgments reported during five months of 2009, no cases were found in
which a parent was identified as other than heterosexual. Nor did any of the cases apparently
involve two parents of the same gender.
141. Bala & Bailey, supra note 13 at 20.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid. See also Elster, supra note 12 at 17. Elster paraphrases without endorsing the following
argument that adultery should be punished by denying custody to the wrongdoer:
"[a]lthough the welfare of a given child may be best promoted if custody is given to an
adulterous parent, the welfare of children in general may require a presumption, which could
be more or less strong, against this practice."
SEMPLE, WHOSE BEST INTERESTS 317
the following passage suggests that Bala and Bailey also believe that access should be
enforced because failure to do so would be unfair to the non-custodial parent:
Canadian law imposes and enforces child support obligations on all parents. It
would be grossly unfair and deeply undermining of respect for the justice system if
non-custodial parents were legally obliged to pay child support, but could not look
to the legal system to enforce access. 1 4
Like much of the scholarship, the dominant thrust of Bala and Bailey's article is
upholding the best interests of children, but a subtle undercurrent of concern for
adults' rights and interests can also be detected." 4
2. THE ALl'S PRINCIPLES OF THELAW OFFAMLYDISSOLUTION
A forthright proposal to recognize parental interests in custody and access law is
found in the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution released by the ALI in
2002.' The Principles are apparently unique in that they explicitly give a place to
parents' rights in custody and access law. Chapter two deals with custody and ac-
cess, inter alia, and section 2.02(1) enshrines the BIC principle-"the primary
objective of Chapter 2 is to serve the child's best interests."..
However, section 2.02(2) then states that "a secondary objective of Chapter 2
is to achieve fairness between the parents.""' The commentary argues that fairness
to parents is "a valid objective in itself' that is also "intertwined with the child's
interests.""' This sentence makes it clear that consideration of parental interests
is not, for the Principles, merely instrumental to serving children. It is an inde-
pendent, although subordinate, goal. The commentary states that parental fairness
can be used as a tiebreaker when two alternatives are equal with regard to
144. Bala & Bailey, ibid. at 20-21.
145. Similarly, see Gene C. Colman, "Procedural Fairness and Case Conferences" (2004) 20
Can. J. Fam. L. 379 at 384. Colman asks, "Can any judge therefore truly justify to
himself or herself taking custody or access away from a parent absent adequate notice
and admissible evidence?" While the idea that custody or access is an entitlement or
right belonging to a parent (as opposed to the child) is never explicitly argued, it
appears to be the unspoken premise underlying comments like this one.
146. American Law Institute, supra note 9.
147. Ibid. at s. 2.01(1).
148. Ibid. at s. 2.02(2).
149. Ibid. at s. 2.02, Comment (b).
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BIC.150 However, it is also clear that parents' interests could be a reason to
choose the outcome that would be worse for the child(ren).'"' The centrepiece
of the Principles is the approximation standard described above.'1 2 One of the
arguments given for this standard reflects the parental fairness objective: " [t] he
reliance on past caretaking is also designed to correspond reasonably well to the
parties' actual expectations."" While the approximation standard has not been
widely adopted, it does provide an example of how parental interests in custody
and access outcomes might be given legal weight.'15 4
B. PROCEDURAL REFORM FOR CHILDREN
If the unanimity of our legislators and judges reflects a social consensus that the
best interests of the children involved should be the only relevant factor in custody
and access disputes, then procedural reform is urgently needed. The status quo
empowers adult litigants in ways that often work to the detriment of their chil-
dren. This section will support this claim before surveying the social science
literature regarding the benefits and costs of parenting litigation for the children
involved. It will conclude by suggesting reforms that might improve the cost-
benefit balance.155
150. Ibid. The ALI states, "[W]hen more than one rule could be expected to serve the interests of
children equally well, or when the impact of the alternative rules upon children is uncertain,
Chapter 2 adopts the rule most likely to produce results that achieve the greatest fairness
between parents."
151. Fairness to parents is less important than BIC under the Principles ofLaw. Presumably,
therefore, an outcome not in the child(ren)'s best interest would have to produce a relatively
large fairness benefit for parents at the expense of a relatively small detriment to the
child(ren), compared to its BIC-maximizing alternative. In this, the Principles ofLaw appear
to be accepting Jon Elster's argument about the weights that should be placed on children's
and parents' interests. See Elster, supra note 12 at 20.
152. American Law Institute, supra note 9 at s. 2.08.
153. Ibid. at s. 2.08, Comment (b).
154. Michael R. Clisham and Robin Fretwell Wilson, "American Law Institute's Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory
Footnote? " (2008) 42 Fam. L.Q. 573 at 576 (noting that West Virginia is the only state to
have adopted the approximation standard).
155. Cost-benefit analysis has some support in Ontario's Family Law Rules, supra note 71,
s. 2(5)(e). This subsection requires judges, in discharging their duty to actively manage cases,
to consider "whether the likely benefits of taking a step justify the cost." A passage from a
recent judgment of S.B. Sherr J. suggests that Rule 2 might be used with the welfare of the
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Custody and access litigation can be analogized to diagnostic surgery on a
child patient. Suppose that you are responsible for making medical decisions on
behalf of a child who suffers from a medical condition. There are two possible
ways to treat this condition, and it is clear that one or the other must be utilized.
The child's doctors ask your permission to undertake diagnostic surgery, which
will provide information about which of the two treatment options would be
better for the child. What do you say?
You should not answer before asking two further questions. First, how sub-
stantial are the benefits of the diagnostic surgery for the child? You have been told
already that it will help indicate which of the two treatment options is best for
the child. However, you don't know whether the diagnostic procedure is certain
to answer this question. Is it possible that the results will be ambiguous? Nor do
you yet know how important it is for the child's health to pick the better of the
two treatment options. Perhaps, regardless of the diagnostic result, the less appro-
priate treatment would be almost as good as the more appropriate treatment.
Second, what are the costs of the diagnostic surgery for the child? Is there a
high probability that it will create moderate short-term pain? Is there a small
probability that the procedure itself will also do long-term damage? These questions
about benefits and costs for children must also be asked about custody and access
litigation if we are to make procedural choices that actually put them first.
1. BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN OF PARENTING LITIGATION
The primary benefit of custody and access litigation for children is that it may
lead to the parenting arrangement that is in the child's best interest being put into
effect, when this would not otherwise occur. There are three important reasons
not to overestimate this benefit. First, the ability of litigation or any other pro-
family in mind: "Rule 2 provides courts with considerable flexibility in managing cases. The
days of having the right to endlessly litigate a case without regard to time and expense are
over. There is a recognition in the rules that such litigation is damaging to families, creates
undue expense, wastes time and does not achieve justice." See Figurado v. Figurado, [2009]
W.D.F.L. 2352 at para. 9 (Ont. Ct. J.); Family Law Rules, s. 2. However, Rule 2(5)(e) does
not state whether benefits to the child are relevant. Given that case management is meant to
promote the "primary objective" of the FLR and given that the primary objective does not
include the interests of the child, the more harmonious reading of this section would be that
it is benefits to the parties and benefits to the court that are relevant. See Family Law Rules, s.
2(3); Part II, above. In any case, the Rules do not in any other place specify benefits to the
child as a criterion in making procedural decisions.
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cedure to determine with certainty what would be best for a child is highly ques-
tionable. As noted above,' some scholars argue that it is simply beyond the
power of the law-even with mental health science as an ally-to predict what
will be best for a child given the uncertainty of the future.' In the words of
one recent article, "[P]articularly in those cases where angry, hurt, but 'good
enough' parents are contesting custody or the allocation of time sharing, there is
generally no basis in psychology or law for choosing between parents."'58
Second, even if the procedure does identify the best parenting arrangement,
the best arrangement might not be dramatically better for the child than the alter-
native. A judge seeking to craft the perfect parenting arrangement has limited
resources at his or her disposal, namely the time and effort that the litigants are
willing to dedicate to the child. If a parent's conduct is bad enough to pose a clear
risk to the child, it is the task of the child protection system, and not that of the
judge hearing the private family law matter, to keep him or her away from the
child. In most custody and access disputes, both parents are "good enough" to
avoid this form of intervention. Within these constraints, the alternatives may
represent only small gradations of benefit to the child.
Third, if the best parenting arrangement is identified and put into place, it
may not last long. As observed above, variation and appeal provide legal avenues
whereby orders may be changed. More commonly, if a party does not comply with
a parenting order, and no other party seeks to enforce it, that order becomes a dead
letter. Parents with access rights are allowed simply to disappear from a child's life,
with or without the consent of the other parties and the child. A number of authors
have noted the mutability of parenting arrangements after litigation.' Empirical
evidence suggests that shared parenting and joint custody arrangements are espe-
156. See Part I, above.
157. Michael King, "Future Uncertainty as a Challenge to Law's Programmes: The Dilemma of
Parental Disputes" (2000) 63 Mod. L. Rev. 523.
158. Joan B. Kelly & Janet R. Johnston, "Commentary on Tippins and Wittmann's 'Empirical
and Ethical Problems with Custody Recommendations: A Call for Clinical Humility and
Judicial Vigilance"' (2005) 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 233.
159. See e.g. Alison Clarke-Stewart & Cornelia Brentano, Divorce: Causes and Consequences (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006) at 206ff; Smart & Neale, supra note 132 at 36, 42; and
Amanda Barrart & Sandra Burman, "Deciding the Best Interests of the Child: An International
Perspective on Custody Decision Making" (2001) 118 S.A.L.J. 556 at 559.
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cially likely to shift over time."'o The mutability of post-litigation parenting ar-
rangements often reflects a responsible and pragmatic response on the part of
the parents to the changing needs of their child. However, mutability also re-
duces the expected benefit to a child from a court's parenting order, and there-
fore increases the chance that the cost of the procedure will exceed the benefit
for that child.
2. COSTS TO CHILDREN OF PARENTING LITIGATION
While the benefits of the process for the child are less significant than one might
assume, the costs can be substantial."' Occasionally, children participate directly
in custody and access litigation by testifying or being interviewed by a judge. They
may also contribute evidence in the form of an affidavit or other written commu-
nication to the decision maker. Direct children's participation of this nature occurs
rarely in Canada-the author's empirical research described above found it in only
3 per cent of the sample of reported cases."' While there is a live debate about the
potential benefits to children of direct participation in the process, it is also clear
that this can be highly traumatic.' 3 This is especially true if a child is asked directly
to choose between his or her parents."6 It is much more common for children to
participate via assessments conducted by psychologists or social workers.'
160. McIntosh, supra note 13; Sharon Moyer, Child Custody Arrangements: Their Characteristics
and Outcomes, Report 2004-FCY-3E, online: Department of Justice (Canada) <http://www.
justice.gc.caleng/pilfcy-fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/2004/2004_3/pdfl2004-Se.pdf>; and Saini &
Birnbaum, supra note 15. But see Lawrence M. Berger et al, "The Stability of Child Physical
Placements Following Divorce: Descriptive Evidence From Wisconsin" (2008) 70 J.
Marriage & Fam. 273.
161. Wilson & Symons, supra note 35 at § 2.8, citing Norris Weismann, "On Access after
Parental Separation" (1992) 36 R.F.L. (3d) 35. Wilson and Symons note, "[S]o dissonant is
the courtroom forum from the milieu of the family that the process, in and of itself, results
in greater harm than help to those who suffer through it."
162. Semple, "The Silent Child," supra note 74 at 13.
163. Ronda Bessner, The Voice ofthe Child in Divorce, Custody and Access Proceedings, 2002-FCY-
1E (Background paper) (Ottawa: Department ofJustice Canada, 2002), online: <http://dsp-
psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection/J3-1-2002-LE.pdf> at 56; Nicholas Bala, "Child
Representation in Alberta: Role and Responsibilities of Counsel for the Child in Family
Proceedings" (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 845 [Bala, "Child Representation in Alberta"]; and
Pearson & Gallaway, supra note 5 at c. 2, s. B.
164. Bala, ibid.
165. Semple, "The Silent Child," supra note 74.
322 (20101 48 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
While these assessments are designed to gather information about the child with-
out causing harm, some scholars have suggested that assessments can also be
emotionally difficult for a child.1"
Children's well-being is affected by their parents' financial security, and
custody and access litigation can easily become expensive enough to threaten this
security.' The median after-tax income for an unattached individual Canadian
was $24,200 in 2007,'" and a recent report found that the median income of
applicants in Ontario's unified family courts was $25,200."9 Examining some
of the costs associated with parenting litigation against this comparator suggests
how substantial the financial impact can be. According to a 2009 survey by Cana-
dian Lawyer magazine, the average legal fee for a contested divorce in Ontario is
$12,602.0 However, a "contested" divorce might not include much, if any, court-
room advocacy, and the average legal cost for a case culminating in a two-day
civil trial was $45,477."' Retaining other private sector professionals, such as
mediators or assessors, naturally adds to the cost. A 2007 article suggested typical
costs of $1,500 to $6,000 for a social worker assessment, and $3,000 to $20,000
or more for a psychologist assessment."
A recent Ontario Bar Association report stated that 40 per cent of civil litigants
lack lawyers, and that the rate among family litigants is even higher than this aver-
age."77 This is in part a symptom of the strain that legal fees put on separating
parents."'7 Parents without lawyers save money but pay the price in their own
166. Nicholas Bala, "Mohan, Assessments & Expert Evidence: Understanding the Family Law
Context," Working Paper No. 07-02, in Queen's Faculty ofLaw Legal Studies Research Paper
Series (14 April 2007), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=989761> at 36 [Bala, "Mohan"].
167. Schepard, supra note 14 at 105.
168. Statistics Canada, "The Daily: Income of Canadians," online: <http://www.statcan.gc.cal
daily-quotidien/090603/dq090603a-eng.htm>.
169. Alfred A. Mamo, Peter G. Jaffe & Debbie G. Chiodo, Recapturing and Renewing the Vision of
the Family Court (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), 2007) at 81, online:
<http://www.crvawc.caldocuments/Family/20Court%2OStudy%202007.pdf>.
170. Kelly Harris, "The Going Rate" Canadian Lawyer 33:6 (June 2009) 32 at 37.
171. Ibid
172. Bala, "Mohan," supra note 166 at 25.
173. Ontario Bar Association, Getting It Right: The Report of the Ontario Bar Association justice
Stakeholder Summit (Toronto, 2008) at 8, online: <http://www.oba.org/en/pdf/Justice
Summit-sml.pdf>.
174. According to one survey conducted in the Kingston area, 83 per cent of litigants without
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time and aggravatiQn. Whether or not the parties have lawyers, litigation is time-
consuming to the extent that it can interrupt parenting time."' The financial and
time stresses of litigation come at a time when the average separating parent is
likely to be experiencing various other transitional costs and stresses associated
with relationship breakdown.
The financial and time costs of parenting litigation, although paid directly
by parents, are also paid indirectly by their children in two ways. First, time and
money spent on custody and access litigation is time and money that cannot be
spent on parenting. Second, given the stress that is likely to accompany any rela-
tionship breakdown, the costs of custody and access litigation create additional
strain and financial insecurity that may undermine parenting. Alison Clarke-
Stewart and Cornelia Brentano reviewed a number of studies and concluded that
the scarcity of resources that often accompanies divorce may account for as much
as half of the negative impacts on children that have been associated with it."'
Finally, custody and access litigation costs children because it increases the
likelihood that they will be exposed to parental conflict, which the literature
unequivocally establishes to be bad for them. While some parents may expect
catharsis from litigation, the reality is that it intensifies hostility. According to
Justice Brownstone,
Most couples who bring their disputes to family court do not enjoy, or ultimately
benefit from, the experience. ... [I]n many cases, the parties' ability to communi-
cate and co-operate with each other as co-parents became worse, not better, as a
result of family court litigation. 77
lawyers stated that they were unable to afford the fees. See Anne-Marie Langan,
"Threatening the Balance of the Scales of Justice: Unrepresented Litigants in the Family
Courts of Ontario" (2004) 30 Queen's L.J. 825 at 832. The rate of self-representation also
reflects the small supply of publicly-funded legal aid certificates for private family law
disputes. See e.g. Michael Trebilcock, Report ofthe LegalAidReview (Toronto: Ministry of
the Attorney General (Ontario), 2008) at 109, online: <http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.
on.calenglish/about/pubs/trebilcock/legal-aid-report_2008_EN.pdf>.
175. Schepard, supra note 14 at 105.
176. Clarke-Stewart & Brentano, supra note 159 at 135.
177. Brownstone, supra note 98 at 12 [emphasis in original].
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This point has often been made in the literature."' Strong empirical evidence
for it came from Marsha Pruett and Tamara Jackson, who conducted interviews
with forty-one Connecticut parents who had recently divorced."' A remarkable
71 per cent of the respondents stated that the legal process had made their feelings
of anger and hostility more extreme.' Furthermore, 75 per cent of them "indi-
cated that the process intensified their negative perceptions of the other parent by
pitting them against each other and replacing direct communication."' In a
subsequent article, Pruett and her colleagues argued that
parents' opposing positions are exacerbated through the adversarial process because
the lack of clear facts or standards on which to make judgments serves to augment
the family struggles. Conflict spreads and feeds on itself, escalating the destructive
family dynamics that the divorce was intended to dissipate. The legal system thus
operates as a powerful vehicle for sustaining or increasing parental conflict. 182
Andrew Schepard concurs that litigation increases interparental hostility,
but offers a somewhat different explanation for the phenomenon. He suggests,
[Litigation] puts a premium on parents finding fault with each other. ... [P]arents
who participate in adversary procedures focus on the weaknesses of the other par-
ent, rather than focusing on how to reconstruct their post-divorce or separation re-
lationship for their children's benefit.
8 3
178. See e.g. Robert E. Emery, David Sbarra & Tara Grover, "Divorce Mediation: Research and
Reflections" (2005) 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 22 at 35; Rhonda Freeman, "Parenting after Divorce:
Using Research to Inform Decision Making about Children" (1998) 15 Can. J. Fam. L. 79
at 104; Hardcastle, supra note 70 at 66; and Janet Weinstein, "And Never the Twain Shall
Meet Again: The Best Interests of Children and the Adversary System" (1997) 52 U. Miami
L. Rev. 79.
179. Marsha Kline Pruett & Tamara D. Jackson, "Lawyer's Role during the Divorce Process:
Perceptions of Parents, Their Young Children, and Their Attorneys" (1999) 33 Fam. L.Q. 283.
180. Ibid. at 298.
181. Ibid.
182. Marsha Kline Pruett, Glendessa M. Insabella & Katherine Gustafson, "The Collaborative
Divorce Project: A Court-Based Intervention for Separating Parents with Young Children"
(2005) 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 38 at 39. See also Brownstone, supra note 98 at 12. Brownstone
offers a similar explanation for "why litigation [is] such a damaging and destructive way to
resolve parental disputes[:] ... [T]he court system is based on an adversarial process in which
'winning' is the object of the exercise."
183. Schepard, supra note 14 at 105.
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Whatever the reason, there appears to be general agreement that family litiga-
tion increases interparental conflict. As noted above, there is an equally strong
consensus that interparental conflict is bad for children.'" One of the costs of
custody and access litigation to children, therefore, is its tendency to increase
interparental conflict."ss
3. WHY LITIGATING PARENTS MAY BE UNRELIABLE BALANCERS OF COST
AND BENEFIT
Sometimes a parent's litigation decisions reflect that parent's accurate perception
of the costs and benefits thereof for the child. Parents can be presumed to be
aware of their children's interests and they often make altruistic decisions, which
put those needs ahead of their own. Like the responsible and conscientious decision
maker in the operating room analogy, parents may weigh the costs and benefits
before deciding whether and how to initiate or continue the diagnostic surgery
that is custody and access litigation.
However, in the context of an acrimonious relationship breakdown, scholars
have identified many reasons why a parent's choices about custody and access
litigation may not be based on an accurate perception of BIC. First, the costs and
benefits of litigation are mysterious, especially to someone who has never been
involved in it before. While explaining these costs and benefits is part of a lawyer's
job, as noted above at least 40 per cent of family court litigants have no lawyers.'"
Second, there are numerous factors that may cloud the judgment of parents
making decisions about custody and access litigation. Parenting litigation may
be initiated or prolonged in order to control or punish the other parent, or to
prolong cohabitation.' Given the context, there are often powerful emotional
issues at play. In the words of Robert Emery,
184. Supra note 15.
185. Schepard, supra note 14 at 95, 105; Watson, supra note 132 at 58; and Robert E. Emery,
"Interparental Conflict and Social Policy" in John H. Grych & Frank D. Fincham, eds.,
Interparental Conflict and Child Development: Theory, Research, andApplications (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 417 at 421.
186. Ontario Bar Association, supra note 173.
187. Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, "Rethinking Joint Custody" (1984) 45 Ohio St. L.J. 455
at 493; Maldonado, supra note 16; Emery, Sbarra & Grover, supra note 178 at 34; and
Goundry, supra note 97 at 19.
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Co-parents are not just parents, but they may be each other's friend (or enemy)
lover (or estranged mate), protector (or abuser), economic partner (or competitor),
family member (or cast-off). ... [I]nterparental conflict may be a result of, or an
expression of, an ongoing dispute about altogether different aspects of the co-
parents' relationship. It has been suggested, for example, that many child custody
disputes may really be attempts to block divorce or to maintain contact with a
former spouse. 18
Carol Smart and Vanessa May suggest that parents interpret the BIC standard
as a judgment regarding who is the better parent. Yielding custody therefore means
accepting a characterization of oneself as the less adequate parent, which is very
difficult for many people to do.'"
Third, a number of scholars have suggested that custody and access litigation
can be seized upon by parents who need but lack any other opportunity to be
publicly vindicated or to vent.'" In Canada, as in many other Western jurisdic-
tions, opportunities to discuss fault and conduct in the context of relationship
breakdown have been gradually eliminated from our law."' Although courts
and legislatures have also tried to eliminate them from custody and access law,
evidence about past conduct is legally relevant if it bears on parenting ability.'92
188. Emery, supra note 185 at 417 [emphasis in original].
189. U.K., Department of Constitutional Affairs, Residence and Contact Disputes in Court, Volume
2 (DCA Research Series 4/05) by Carol Smart et al (London: Department of Constitutional
Affairs, 2005) at 56.
190. Carol Smart & Vanessa May, "Why Can't They Agree? The Underlying Complexity of
Contact and Residence Disputes" (2004) 26 J. Soc. Welfare & Fam. L. 347; Francis J.
Catania, Jr., "Accounting to Ourselves for Ourselves: An Analysis of Adjudication in the
Resolution of Child Custody Disputes" (1992) 71 Neb. L. Rev. 1228 at 1256; Maldonado,
supra note 16; and U.K., Department of Constitutional Affairs, Residence and Contact
Disputes in Court, Volume I (DCA Research Series 6/03) by Carol Smart et al (London:
Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2003) at 100.
191. See DivorceAct, supra note 5, ss. 8(2)(a), 8(2)(b). The overwhelming majority of Canadian
divorces are granted on the basis that the spouses "have lived separate and apart for at least
one year" under subsection (a), and not on the basis of adultery or cruelty under subsection
(b). Conduct is also almost always irrelevant to the financial corollary remedies under the
Divorce Act and provincial legislation.
192. See Divorce Act, ibid., s. 16(9). The subsection states, "In making an order under this
section, the court shall not take into consideration the past conduct of any person unless the
conduct is relevant to the ability of that person to act as a parent of a child." See also
Children's Law Rejbrm Act, supra note 3, s. 24: "[a] person's past conduct shall be considered
only, (a) in accordance with subsection (4) [regarding domestic violence]; or (b) if the court
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Finally, financial disputes arising from relationship breakdown are likely to
be alive at the same time as parenting disputes. Parents may make unreasonable
parenting claims in order to gain a bargaining chip that can subsequently be cashed
in for financial advantage.' Because child support entitlements can depend on
parenting arrangements, parents may have financial incentives to push for custody
or for more parenting time in a joint custody arrangement."'
Justice Brownstone offers compelling examples of parenting litigation for
which the costs to the children involved must exceed the benefits, because the
benefits are nonexistent:
I regularly see parents starting court motions at the slightest infraction or provocation
by the other parent[:] ... a child was not delivered for an access visit with enough
clothing; an item of clothing was not returned after an access visit (or was returned un-
washed); a child's toy has gone missing; a parent was a few minutes late for an access
exchange; a child missed a nap during an access visit. ... I have even seen parents
litigate over the length and style of their child's hair, or the brand of toothpaste a
child should use.195
4. IMPROVING THE COST-BENEFIT BALANCE FOR CHILDREN
Part II, above, described three ways in which the procedure serves the adults
involved. They decide if the procedure occurs, they control most of the evidence,
and they decide when the procedure ends. Not all of these characteristics of the
status quo are contrary to children's interests, and good procedural reform for
children would likely not involve abandoning them all.
This is true for two reasons. First, some of the procedural power that parents
hold is consonant with the interests of their children. For example, for the state
to examine all consensual arrangements between separated parents would be very
invasive and would probably create more costs than benefits for children. The
is satisfied that the conduct is otherwise relevant to the person's ability to act as a parent."
193. Goundry, supra note 97 at 11; Patricia Geraldine Tobin, Clinical Recommendations for Sole
Custody in Child Custody Disputes: An Analysis of Sex-Related Factors in the Decision Making
andAssessment Process (Ph.D. Thesis, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University
of Toronto, 1989) at 14, 33.
194. Federal Child Support Guidelines, supra note 65; Contino v. Leonelli-Contino, [2005] 3
S.C.R. 217.
195. Brownstone, supra note 98 at 14. Later, at page 73, Brownstone adds that "all too often,
parents are filled with hatred and vindictiveness that they keep the litigation going as a
means of torturing each other without the slightest concern for the effect of their immature
behaviour on their children."
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procedural empowerment of parents may also lead them to regard the outcomes
as more legitimate,"' which in turn increases the likelihood of compliance, which
is in the interests of children.
Second, while custody and access disputes are fundamentally unlike financial
family law issues, they do come bundled with those financial issues. People ex-
perience them together when intimate relationships break down. A procedure
calibrated to protect the child's interests above all would be patently inappropriate
for the determination of issues like spousal support and property division, in which
children's interests are only tangentially relevant. It would therefore have to be
a parallel system, and subjecting families to multiple procedures would have
many drawbacks.
However, there are certain practical procedural reforms that could help recon-
cile custody and access procedure with the best interests of the child. Procedural
reform for children would begin by explicitly recognizing their interests in the FLR.
An excellent model in this regard is Australia's Family Law Act. In any proceeding
involving a child in that country, "the first principle is that the court is to consider
the needs of the child concerned and the impact that the conduct of the proceed-
ings may have on the child in determining the conduct of the proceedings.""'
The primary objective of Ontario's FLR is "dealing with cases justly," and the
definition of "dealing with cases justly," as provided by Rule 2(3), should be
amended to include "producing net benefits for any child or children involved
in the proceeding.""' To give effect to this aspiration, it might be wise for the
legislature to re-examine the rules about (1) whether custody and access litiga-
tion occurs, (2) how it occurs when it does occur, and (3) whether and how
children's evidence is heard within it.
196. Colman, supra note 145 at 383, 398; Hardcastle, supra note 70 at 71-74.
197. Family Law Act 1975 (Cth.), s. 69ZN(3) [Family Law Act 1975]. This statute has two other
child-focused procedural principles that have no analogue in Ontario's Family Law Rules,
supra note 71. Section 69ZN(5)(a) provides that "the proceedings are to be conducted in a
way that will safeguard ... the child concerned against family violence, child abuse and child
neglect." Section 69ZN(6) states that "the proceedings are, as far as possible, to be conducted
in a way that will promote cooperative and child focused parenting by the parties."
198. Family Law Rules, ibid., s. 2.
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i. WHETHER LITIGATION OCCURS
Whether a procedural step occurs is a question that judges should answer in light
of the probable costs and benefits thereof to the child. The status quo allows
litigation to occur or continue even when its likely benefits for children do not
exceed its likely costs. This is certainly true with regard to the most extreme cases,
such as those described above." Apart from the endless sagas of the high-
conflict repeat litigators, this may also be true with regard to the more trivial
variation motions. For example, consider a motion to vary access. Assuming
that the access arrangement sought by the moving party is better for the child,
assuming that the court reaches this conclusion, and assuming that the new
order is obeyed, it is still entirely possible that the deleterious impact on the child's
financial security brought about by the parents' expenditures on lawyers (and,
perhaps, expert witnesses) to argue the motion will outweigh the benefit of the
change. The non-financial costs to children outlined above make it even less
likely that a motion to vary access will have a net benefit for the child.
The mechanisms currently available for curtailing litigation might be strength-
ened to prevent litigation of this nature. Rule 2(5)(e) obliges the court to con-
sider the benefits and costs of a procedural step before allowing it to occur. This
should also be amended to explicitly require consideration of the benefits and
costs of a proposed step to any children involved. Second, "vexatious proceedings"
should have a special definition in the context of custody and access litigation-
proceedings whose expected benefits for the child or children involved do not ex-
ceed their costs. Such proceedings could be made subject to the remedy available
in section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.200 Judges might be given the power
they possess in Australia: to make such an order on the court's initiative even if
no party has sought it.20 '
As observed above, courts are reluctant to make parenting orders about older
adolescents due to the likelihood that they will simply "vote with their feet."202
The CLRA affirms "the right of a child of sixteen or more years of age to withdraw
from parental control."203 However, the applicable legislation continues to allow
199. See Part II(C), above.
200. Supra note 112, s. 140.
201. Family Law Act 1975, supra note 197, s. 69ZP.
202. Davies, supra note 124.
203. Children's Law Reform Act, supra note 3, s. 65.
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custody and access orders to be sought for these children. 20" Given that orders of
this nature are less likely to be granted, and are perhaps legally unenforceable if
they are granted, does allowing parents to seek them create net benefits for the
children involved? Or should the legislature close the door on parenting orders
for older adolescents in order to save them from the procedural costs of litigation
that is unlikely to do them much good?
ii. HOW THE LITIGATION IS CONDUCTED
Once it is determined that a step in the procedure should occur, ideally the way
in which that step proceeds should be determined in light of the cost-benefit calcu-
lus for the child. Reforms to parenting litigation procedure may demonstrably
reduce its costs to the children involved, without equivalent reductions in its
benefits. Here, too, Australia is a leader. A pilot Children's Cases Program was
launched in 2004 in Sydney-area family courts.205 In addition to substantial
efforts to encourage voluntary settlement, this initiative also modified trial proce-
dure itself. For example, the judge was given substantial power to limit the evidence
put forward by the parties.206 A subsequent evaluation, which compared this pilot
project to the mainstream court system, found that those involved in the pilot
program reported "better management of conflict, less damage to the co-parental
relationship, greater satisfaction of parents and children with their living arrange-
ments, and, in association with these, improved children's adjustment." 207
Imposing higher procedural costs on children may be justified in some par-
enting cases but not in others, depending on what benefits the child stands to gain
from the procedure. For example, suppose Pat and Cameron are seeking a divorce.
They are more or less evenly matched in terms of their ability to parent their child
Jane. Suppose further that joint custody is not an option in this case, due to the
204. Ibid., s. 18(2); Divorce Act, supra note 5, s. 2(1).
205. Stephen O'Ryan, "A Significantly Less Adversarial Approach: The Family Court of
Australia's Children's Cases Program" (Paper presented to the 22nd Australian Institute of
Judicial Administration Conference, Wellington, New Zealand, 18 September 2004), online:
<http://www.aija.org.au/ac04/papers/ORyan.pdf>. It was subsequently renamed the "Less
Adversarial Trial" program. See Jennifer E. McIntosh, Diana Bryant & Kristen Murray,
"Evidence of a Different Nature: The Child-Responsive and Less Adversarial Initiatives of
the Family Court of Australia" (2008) 46 Fam. Ct. Rev. 125 at 126.
206. Alastair Nicholson, Practice Direction No. 2 of2004: The Children's Cases Program, 1 March
2004 (Sydney- Family Court of Australia); O'Ryan, ibid. at 21.
207. McIntosh, Bryant & Murray, supra note 205 at 130.
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level of hostility between Pat and Cameron.20 The available options with regard
to the custody decision are therefore either sole custody to Pat or sole custody
to Cameron. The non-custodial parent will have liberal access rights.
Legally, the correct decision between these options is that which is most
consonant with Jane's best interests. However, the benefits to Jane from reaching
the correct decision are modest. The correct decision does not mean permanently
placing Jane with a fantastic parent and saving her from the custody of an awful
parent. It means only that the slightly better parent will have custody, whereas
the other will have generous access. In this case, the procedure most consonant
with BIC will be a brief and summary one that involves relatively little cost to
the parties and relatively little procedural trauma for Jane, even if this procedure
runs a higher chance of reaching the wrong conclusion.
Conversely, a procedure with higher costs would be appropriate when the
stakes are higher for Jane. For example, suppose Pat and Cameron are seeking a
divorce on consent, incorporating minutes of settlement whereby Pat is to have
sole custody of Jane. However, the court has reason to believe that Cameron would
be a far superior parent, and only reluctantly agreed to.the custody arrangement.
Cameron is in a weaker financial position than Pat, and is afraid of being bank-
rupted by legal fees if the case proceeds to litigation. The settlement offer whereby
Pat receives sole custody also includes a spousal support term that Cameron
desperately needs. In this case, the procedure most consonant with BIC will be
more lengthy and costly for the child Jane. Despite its costs to her, litigation
might be most consonant with BIC in this case, insofar as it will prevent Jane
from ending up in Pat's custody. However, what would actually happen in this
case would be no procedure whatsoever, insofar as the parties have reached a
consensual arrangement.
Amending the procedure depending on the cost-benefit calculus in a given
case is not so simple as merely deciding to curtail litigation. However, precedents
exist in Ontario civil procedure, which, for example, direct cases to Small Claims
Court, simplified procedure, or regular procedure depending on the monetary
value of the claim. This reflects the general policy of proportionality-that the
nature of the proceeding should befit the significance of the claim. Proportionality
is now an explicit interpretive principle in Ontario's Rules of Civil Procedure,
208. See e.g. Kaplanis v. Kaplanis (2005), 249 D.L.R. (4th) 620 (Ont. C.A.).
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which provide that "the court shall make orders and give directions that are
proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount
involved, in the proceeding. "209
The proportionality principle is more difficult to apply to custody and ac-
cess litigation because it is difficult to evaluate the significance of a proceeding
to a given child, especially before it is adjudicated. Monetary value is not avail-
able as a ready proxy for significance. Further research might develop rules of
thumb about what types of custody and access claims are most likely to produce
more or less substantial benefits for the children involved, and might develop
techniques to tailor the procedure depending on the type of claim.210
iii. WHETHER CHILDREN'S EVIDENCE IS HEARD
It is natural and inevitable that parents' evidence should be prominent in a pro-
cedure focused on the interests of their child. They usually know the child better
than anyone else does, and their personal inclinations and characteristics are also
important, given that they will be the agents of whatever order is ultimately
made. However, this does not justify the apparent absence of children's evi-
dence from-most custody and access cases. I will suggest here that including it
would do more good than harm for the children involved, and that training and
encouraging judges to interview children appears to be the most practical means
of doing so, given resource constraints.
This article has reviewed empirical findings about the types of evidence that are
usually available in custody and access litigation.21' The available data suggest that
the majority of judicial custody and access decisions are made without any form
of children's evidence, if that term is defined to include evidence which comes
directly from the child or from a neutral professional with child-related expertise.
Direct evidence from children may easily have more costs than benefits for them.
209. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, s. 1.04(1.1).
210. Efforts are being made to develop differentiated case management (or "triage") protocols,
whereby cases are streamed to different services and dispute-resolution approaches depending
on their characteristics. See Nancy Ver Steegh, "Family Court Reform and ADR: Shifting
Values and Expectations Transform the Divorce Process" (2008) 42 Fam. L.Q. 659; Peter
Salem, "The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The Beginning of the End for
Mandatory Mediation?" (2009) 47 Fam. Ct. Rev. 371.
211. See Part II(B), above.
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However, most scholars agree that there are ways to involve children that pro-
vide net benefits, both by improving the quality of the outcome and by giving
children the psychologically beneficial sense that they have been consulted in
these decisions which intimately involve them.212 The United Nations Convention
on the Rights ofthe Child also speaks to this point, in Article 12:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her
own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the
child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the
age and maturity of the child.
2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be
heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either
directly, or through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner
consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
213
The "gold standard" for children's evidence may very well be the assessment
or interview of the child conducted by an independent lawyer, social worker, or
mental health professional with specific expertise and training. However, resource
constraints usually make this impossible. Most parents cannot afford to retain
psychologists or social workers to conduct assessments. In Ontario, many of them
turn to the OCL, which provides legal representation to children and social worker
investigations akin to assessments without charge. At one time, the OCL's
predecessor was notified of all Ontario divorces involving minor children,"
and publicly funded investigations were mandatory in every divorce case before
1987.215 However, funding did not keep pace with the increasing prevalence of
custody and access litigation over the second half of the twentieth century.1
212. See e.g. Rachel Birnbaum & Nicholas Bala, "The Child's Perspective on Representation:
Young Adults Report on Their Experiences with Child Lawyers" (2009) Can. J. Fam. L. 11
at 40 [Birnbaum & Bala, "Child's Perspective"]; Coley, supra note 16.
213. UNCRC, supra note 13, art. 12.
214. Rachel Birnbaum & Dena Moyal, "How Social Workers and Lawyers Collaborate to
Promote Resolutions in the Interests of Children: The Interface between Law in Theory and
Law in Action" (2003) 21 Can. Fam. L.Q. 379 at 383.
215. Kevin Marron, "Child rule changed: checks on divorces no longer required" The Globe and
Mail(11 February 1987) All.
216. The same seems to be true further west. Regarding Alberta, see Davies, supra note 124 at
170; Dale Hensley, "Role and Responsibilities of Counsel for the Child in Alberta: A
Practitioner's Perspective and a Response to Professor Bala" (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 871 at
875-76; and Bala, "Child Representation in Alberta," supra note 163 at 847. Regarding
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Today, the OCL declines approximately half of the requests for its involvement
in custody and access cases. A 2007 study found that the OCL was involved in
only 9 per cent of those cases in Ontario's unified family courts in which the
applicant and/or respondent had children."'
There are and will continue to be a large group of cases in which it would not
be in the child's interest to be heard directly and resources do not permit a neu-
tral child expert to speak to and for the child. In such cases, the judicial inter-
view is an obvious mechanism by which children's evidence can be heard. Such
interviews are authorized by section 64(2) of Ontario's CLRA,218 by statutes in
four other provinces, and by case law in the rest of the country.219 However,
they are rare in practice. The author's empirical research did not find a single
reference to a judicial interview of a child in a sample of 181 reported custody
and access cases.220 Bala and Birnbaum recently interviewed Ontario judges and
found widespread reluctance to interview children.221
In other jurisdictions, such as Ohio, judicial interviews of children in custody
and access litigation are common.222 It is possible that their scarcity in Canada
reflects not a conclusion on the part of judges that interviews invariably do more
harm than good to the children, but rather a discomfort or unfamiliarity with
this function. Interviewing is a form of active evidence gathering, and as such it
is a departure from the traditional judicial role. However, it is difficult to believe
that, in a dispute that is focused entirely on a child and his or her future, the child
British Columbia, see Ministry of Attorney General (B.C.), Family Relations Act Review
Discussion Paper (Justice Services Branch-Civil and Family Law Policy Office, 2007) at c. 8,
"Children's Participation," 9-10. Regarding Manitoba, see the recent case of Poste v.
Mitchell-Poste (2009), 242 Man. R. (2d) 310 at para. 51 (Q.B. (Fam. Div.)). In Poste, the
judge ordered an assessment but stated that he was "mindful of the delay which will ensue
given the backlog of outstanding assessments at Family Conciliation Services."
217. Mamo, Jaffe & Chiodo, supra note 169 at 82.
218. Children's Law Reform Act, supra note 3, s. 64(2).
219. Birnbaum & Bala, "Child's Perspective," supra note 212.
220. Semple, "The Silent Child," supra note 74.
221. Rachel Birnbaum & Nicholas Bala, "Judicial Interviews with Children in Custody and
Access Cases: Comparing Experiences in Ontario and Ohio" (2010) 24 Int'l J.L. Pol'y &
Fam. [forthcoming] [Birnbaum & Bala, "Judicial Interviews"].
222. Denise Herman McColley, "Ohio Statutory and Case Law on Interviewing Children" in
Family Law-The Voice ofthe Child, 5 March 2009 (Toronto: Law Society of Upper
Canada, 2009) 2a-5; Birnbaum & Bala, "Judicial Interviews," ibid.
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should have no involvement whatsoever when resources do not allow for a dedi-
cated neutral professional to assist. If further research supports the conclusion
that judicial interviews are under-utilized in custody and access cases, then judges
should be trained and encouraged to deploy this tool more often.223
Judicial interviews are certainly not always appropriate, most obviously if
the child is too young to provide meaningful information. They may also pose
some of the same risks for the child as viva voce courtroom testimony. The OCL's
Dan Goldberg draws a distinction between a judicial "preference interview" (in
which the child is asked more or less directly which outcome he or she would
choose) and a judicial "conversation" with a child.224 He argues that the latter,
which may focus more on getting to know the child or explaining the process,
is substantially less dangerous. This type of interview may skirt the pitfalls while
capturing most of the therapeutic and evidentiary advantages of including children's
voices that have been identified in the literature. 225
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a fundamental contradiction in our approach to custody and access dis-
putes. The statutes, case law, and scholarship all clearly proclaim that the best
interests. of the child are the only relevant consideration. This distinctive legal
standard renders the parties' claims and needs irrelevant as ends in themselves.
However, the procedure by which we resolve disputes about parenting embodies
the opposite philosophy. As in all civil litigation, the parties have a great deal of
control over the process. While children's evidence is a component of our system
and while the material change threshold does effectively prevent some litigation
which is not in children's interests, these are exceptions to the general rule: a
procedure which empowers the adult parties. One obvious way to reconcile the
inconsistency would be legal reform to recognize parents' interests in the outcome.
223. See G. (L.E.) v. G. (A.), 2002 BCSC 1455. Martinson J. concluded that judges have the
authority to interview children, and that in some circumstances doing so may be in
their interests.
224. Dan L. Goldberg, "Judicial Interviews of Children in Custody and Access Cases: Time to
Pause and Reflect" in Family Law-The Voice ofthe Chid, 10 March 2010 (Toronto: Law
Society of Upper Canada, 2010) 7-1.
225. See e.g. Birnbaum & Bala, "Child's Perspective," supra note 212; Coley, supra note 16; and
Birnbaum & Bala, "Judicial Interviews," supra note 221.
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The more challenging, but-to the author-the more just resolution to the
contradiction is to reform the procedure to give children's interests the same priority
that they have in the law. The present article has only begun to sketch out the
dimensions of this task. The task calls, first, for an accounting of the costs and
benefits of different types of custody and access litigation for different types of
children. Then, we must find ways to ensure that every custody and access dispute
is resolved with the maximum possible net benefits for the child or children in-
volved. Only after this endeavour is complete can we as a society pledge our
allegiance, without hypocrisy, to the best interests of the children involved in
custody and access disputes.
